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ARTICLES
DOCUMENTING DEATH: PUBLIC ACCESS TO
GOVERNMENT DEATH RECORDS AND
ATTENDANT PRIVACY CONCERNS
Jeffrey R. Boles*
This Article examines the contentious relationship between public
rights to access government-held death records and privacy rights con-
cerning the deceased, whose personal information is contained in those
same records. This right of access dispute implicates core democratic
principles and public policy interests. Open access to death records,
such as death certificates and autopsy reports, serves the public interest
by shedding light on government agency performance, uncovering poten-
tial government wrongdoing, providing data on public health trends, and
aiding those investigating family history, for instance. Families of the
deceased have challenged the release of these records on privacy
grounds, as the records may contain sensitive and embarrassing infor-
mation about the deceased. Legislatures and the courts addressing this
dispute have collectively struggled to reconcile the competing open ac-
cess and privacy principles. The Article demonstrates how a substantial
portion of the resulting law in this area is haphazardly formed, signifi-
cantly overbroad, and loaded with unintended consequences. The Arti-
cle offers legal reforms to bring consistency and coherence to this
currently disordered area of jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a nurse who works in the delivery room of a local hospital
learns that a baby has died at the hospital due to the hospital staff's fail-
ure to watch the baby's monitors. The nurse also learns that the hospital
informed the baby's parents that the baby died of toxemia. Believing
that hospital administration is attempting to cover up the matter, the
nurse contacts a newspaper reporter to relay this information. Because
the nurse is fearful of losing her job, she does not provide the baby's
name to the reporter, but she promises the reporter that she will confirm
which baby caused concern if the reporter obtains the baby's name.
With this information, the reporter decides to inspect the death cer-
tificates on file in the local registrar's office to determine if an infant has
died of toxemia at the involved hospital during the relevant time period.
In order to access the death certificates, the reporter sends a freedom of
information request to the local registrar, but the local registrar denies
access to the reporter, citing privacy grounds. The reporter then contacts
the State Registrar of Vital Statistics and makes the same request, which
again is denied.
The newspaper then files a lawsuit, arguing that death certificates
are public records subject to public disclosure under the state's freedom
of information law. The newspaper petitions the court for an order to
grant its reporter access to the requested government records.' In decid-
ing whether to rule in favor of the newspaper or the government, the
court must face a highly contentious and highly fractured area of
jurisprudence.
Public access to death certificates, autopsy reports, and other types
of government-held death records, a seemingly benign legal topic, has
generated robust disagreement, pitting open government principles
against privacy concerns surrounding the deceased, and essentially creat-
ing a "conflict between the interests of the living and the interests of the
dead." 2 Divergent approaches to resolve the conflict have spread across
the country, with statutory and common law differing extensively among
jurisdictions.3
Deep-seated public policy standards have long supported open ac-
cess to government practices, 4 and the public's right to inspect govern-
I This scenario is based upon facts as alleged in Home News v. Dep't of Health, 570
A.2d 1267, 1268-69 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
2 Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 763, 791 (2009).
3 See, e.g., infra notes 255, 281 and surrounding text (discussing differing statutory and
common law approaches to autopsy report access).
4 See Glenn Dickinson, The Supreme Court's Narrow Reading of the Public Interest
Served by the Freedom of Information Act, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 194 n.23 (1990) (quoting
James Madison's defense of open access to government practices).
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ment records is a core democratic principle that allows citizens to
monitor government action.5 To this end, Congress and every state legis-
lature have enacted freedom of information laws that provide the public
with varied judicially enforceable access rights to records held by gov-
ernment agencies.6 As President Obama has emphasized, "In our de-
mocracy, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which encourages
accountability through transparency, is the most prominent expression of
a profound national commitment to ensuring an open Government."7 In
turn, Attorney General Holder declared, "[o]pen government requires
agencies to work proactively and respond to requests promptly" to in-
form the public about "what is known and done by Government."8
Under freedom of information laws, government agency records are gen-
erally open for public inspection and copying.
Death records held by the government appear to fall easily within
the scope of the freedom of information laws' reach because government
agencies create and maintain these documents, which serve as "perma-
nent record[s] of the fact of death." 9 The records historically have been
open to public inspection, and the general public has benefited from open
access in multiple ways. For instance, citizens have frequently requested
access to death certificates, for the certificates may provide clues to jour-
nalists and other investigators in uncovering specific instances of medi-
cal malpractice and other types of harmful health practices, raw data to
researchers analyzing public safety trends, and ancestry guidance to indi-
viduals and groups conducting genealogical research. 10 Moreover, from
a public health perspective, death certificate data are a principal means of
detecting community health problems and assessing the effectiveness of
intervention programs targeted to address those problems."
Death records by their nature reveal delicate information about pri-
vate, albeit deceased, individuals. As a matter of course, the records in-
5 See id. at 191-92.
6 Michael Hoefges et al., Privacy Rights Versus FOIA Disclosure Policy: The "Uses
and Effects" Double Standard in Access to Personally-Identifiable Information in Government
Records, 12 WM. & MARY BILL Rrs. J. 1, 2 (2003).
7 Presidential Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Con-
cerning the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009).
8 Office Att'y Gen., Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
(Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf [hereinafter Attorney
General Holder's FOIA Memorandum].
9 DrF. HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., PUB. No. (PHS) 2003-1110, MEDICAi EXAMINERS'
AND CORONERS' HANDBOOK ON DEATH REGISTRATION AND FlirAL DEATH REPORTING 2
(2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datalmisc/hb-me.pdf [hereinafter CDC CORO-
NERS' HANDBOOK].
10 See infra note 241 and accompanying text (describing the frequency by which citizens
request access to death certificates).
11 4B LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA § 32A.56 (5th ed. 2002).
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clude standard personal identification, demographic, and medicall 2 data
on their subjects. Beyond this routine content, the records may contain
sensitive revelations, such as indicators that the deceased committed sui-
cide or died from a drug overdose or a sexually transmitted disease.
Open access to records with such sensitive content clashes with notions
of privacy, specifically the "informational privacy"' 3 interest "in avoid-
ing disclosure of personal matters."' 4 Although case law dictates that "a
person's privacy right terminates at death,"' 5 courts recognize that fami-
lies of the deceased maintain a privacy interest in preventing the public
release of sensitive content concerning their loved ones.16
Accordingly, while a number of jurisdictions grant open access to
death records under their freedom of information laws, many legislatures
and courts have been uncomfortable with the freedom of information
laws' application to release what may be highly sensitive death records
to members of the public. A number of state legislatures have largely
decided that death records as a whole should not be publicly accessible;
thus, these states have prohibited the public inspection or copying of
death certificates and/or autopsy records, exempting the documents spe-
cifically from their right-to-know laws.' 7 Many courts justify these ac-
cess restrictions based upon the right to privacy held by the decedent's
family that "protects people from suffering the unhappiness of unwanted
publicity about their deceased relatives."' 8 Yet, other courts argue that
restricting public access to death records is repugnant to government
transparency principles, and that such restrictions essentially amount to
"censor[ing] the public's access to public records, all in the fair name of
12 Death records are generally exempt from the provisions of the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), the federal statute that addresses the confiden-
tiality of certain patient information. See Op. Ga. Att'y Gen. 2007-4 (2007), available at http:/
/law.ga.gov/opinion/2007-4 ("responding to a request for access to ... death certificates ... is
required by law and not subject to the prohibitions of HIPAA."); Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 04018
(2004), available at http://www.ago.ne.gov/ag opinion-view?oid=4063 (finding that HIPAA
does not restrict the release of autopsy reports or death certificates).
13 Martin E. Halstuk, Shielding Private Lives From Prying Eyes: The Escalating Conflict
Between Constitutional Privacy and the Accountability Principle of Democracy, I I Com-
MLAW CONSPECTUs 71, 79 (2003).
14 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
15 New Era Pubis. Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 588 n.4 (2d Cir. 1989).
16 See, e.g., Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004) (rec-
ognizing "family members' right to personal privacy with respect to their close relative's
death-scene images.").
17 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. Coon § 23-02.1-27 (2011) (statute prohibiting the public disclo-
sure of death certificates); WAs". Rv. Coo § 68.50.105 (2012) (statute prohibiting the pub-
lic disclosure of autopsy reports).
18 Metter v. Los Angeles Exam'r, 95 P.2d 491, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939) (defining a
relational privacy right as "a right to be spared unhappiness through publicity conceming an-
other person because of one's relationship to such person."). See generally Daniel J. Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. Ri-v. 1087 (2002) (providing overview of informational
privacy law).
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'personal privacy,' [which] eviscerates the state's freedom of informa-
tion act and moves the freedom of information cause one giant step back-
ward."1 9 Still other courts and legislatures are struggling to find a proper
balance between the public interest to access the government's death
records and the privacy interests of the deceased's immediate family.
This Article analyzes the clashing open government and privacy in-
terests and the thorny legal issues inherent in providing public access to
death records. It demonstrates how well-intentioned laws that close pub-
lic access to death records are bad public policy, chill expression need-
lessly, and offend freedom of information laws and their underlying
principles. Part I provides a brief overview of freedom of information
laws, with a particular focus on their privacy-based exemption provi-
sions. Part II assesses the government's involvement with the deceased
upon death and discusses the legal structure that mandates the issuance
of death certificates and autopsy reports. Part III examines death certifi-
cate and autopsy record open access disputes, analyzes legislative and
judicial responses to open access permissions and privacy concerns in-
volving these death records, and concludes with recommendations for
legal reform in this currently muddled area of jurisprudence.
I. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAWS
A. The Federal Freedom of Information Act: Overview, History and
Purpose
In 1966, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)20 to provide public access to federal agency records. 21 The stat-
ute essentially mandates that the public has the right to obtain any federal
19 In re Rosier, 717 P.2d 1353, 1360 (Wash. 1986) (Andersen, J., dissenting).
20 5 U.S.C. § 552.
21 FOIA defines a "record" as including "any information that would be an agency re-
cord . . . when maintained by an agency in any format, including an electronic format." 5
U.S.C. 552(f)(2) (2006). The statute requires federal agencies, inter alia: (1) to disclose auto-
matically, through publication in the Federal Register, their substantive and procedural rules,
statements of general policy, forms, and instructions "for the guidance of the public", (2) to
make available routinely for public inspection and copying agency opinions, specific policy
statements, interpretations, staff manuals, and other documents that are not published in the
Federal Register; and (3) "upon any request for records which ... reasonably describes such
records," to make such records "promptly available to any person." 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a),
552(c) (2006).
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agency record 22 unless FOIA by its terms categorically prohibits the re-
cord's disclosure. 2 3
Congress enacted FOIA as an amendment to the widely-criticized
Section 3 (the public disclosure section) of the Administrative Proce-
dures Act (APA).24 The section severely restricted the public's access to
government documents by granting broad discretion to agencies regard-
ing whether or not to disclose records in their control and by providing
no remedy to the public when agencies unjustly withheld requested
records. 2 5  As the Supreme Court acknowledged, this section was
"plagued with vague phrases" 26 and "was generally recognized as falling
far short of its disclosure goals and came to be looked upon more as a
withholding statute than a disclosure statute." 2 7 Congress recognized
that the shortcomings of APA Section 3 allowed agencies to withhold
legitimate information from the public, so it overhauled the section to
endorse a presumption of government openness. 2 8 By enacting FOIA,
Congress shifted the information access paradigm to provide for expan-
sive transparency to the public.
Embodying a general philosophy of federal agency disclosure,2 9
FOIA "defines a structural necessity in a real democracy."30 By requir-
ing agencies to disclose information to the public, it establishes and en-
forces the right of any person to obtain access to any agency record,
subject to statutory exemptions, "for any public or private purpose." 3'
22 FOIA applies to records of the Executive Branch of the federal government, which
includes fifteen executive branch departments and approximately seventy-five federal agen-
cies. Official US Executive Branch Web Sites, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRuss, http://
www.loc.gov/rr/news/fedgov.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). FOIA does not apply to records
held by Congress, the federal courts, advisory offices of the Executive Branch, or state or local
governments. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1), 552(f)(1) (2006).
23 See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing FOIA's exemptions).
24 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964). See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) (discussing history
of the APA's public disclosure section).
25 U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 754
(1989); Mink, 410 U.S. at 79.
26 Mink, 410 U.S. at 79. For instance, the Section exempted from disclosure "any func-
tion of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest." 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964).
27 Mink, 410 U.S. at 79.
28 S. REP. No. 89-813 (1965), as reprinted in Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Proce-
dure, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION Acr SOURCE BOOK
36, 38 (Comm. Print 1974). See also S. REP. No. 88-1219, at 8 (1964) (noting that Section 3
was "full of loopholes which allow agencies to deny legitimate information to the public" and
that "[i]t has been shown innumerable times that withheld information is often withheld only
to cover up embarrassing mistakes or irregularities and justified by [Section 3's vague
exceptions].").
29 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 754 (quoting Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,
360 (1976) (quoting S. REP. No. 89813, at 3 (1965))).
30 Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004).
31 Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231,
§ 2(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3048, 3048 (1996).
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With an aim of promoting government accountability, the statute
"open[s] agency action to the light of public scrutiny." 32 The Supreme
Court also recognizes that "disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant ob-
jective of the Act." 33 Subsequent amendments to FOIA have reinforced
Congress' intent to: (1) foster democracy by enabling public access to
agency documentation; (2) boost public access to government informa-
tion; (3) ensure agency compliance through prompt time limits; and
(4) "maximize the usefulness of agency records and information col-
lected, maintained, used, retained, and disseminated by the Federal
Government." 34
1. FOIA Requests Are Available for All to Submit
FOIA explicitly permits "any person" to make a FOIA request.35
This includes individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, and
public and private organizations. 36 Moreover, a FOIA requester's iden-
tity generally has no bearing on the merits of her request.37 The Supreme
Court has further clarified that FOIA requesters need not explain or jus-
tify their purpose when requesting any record:
[A]s a general rule, when documents are within FOIA's
disclosure provisions, citizens should not be required to
explain why they seek the information. A person re-
32 Rose, 425 U.S. at 361 (quotation omitted).
33 Id. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he basic purpose of [the]
FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society,
needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed."
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
34 Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231,
§ 2(b), 110 Stat. 3048, 3048-49 (1996). See also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 290
n.10 (1979) ("The [FOIA] legislative history is replete with references to Congress' desire to
loosen the agency's grip on the data underlying governmental decisionmaking."). For a dis-
cussion of the subsequent amendments to FOIA after its enactment, see the DEPARTMENT OF
JusncIE GuIDETO TH-E FREEDOM OF INFORMAuION Acr (2009 ed.) at 5-7, available at http://
www.justice.gov/oip/foia-guideO9/introduction.pdf [hereinafter DOJ GuIDE].
35 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2006); see also DOJ GUIDE,
supra note 34, at 40-43 (explaining the procedural requirements for a FOIA requester).
36 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (2006) (defining "person"); see also
SAE Prods., Inc. v. FBI, 589 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) to
interpret the definition of "person" under the FOIA). See generally DOJ GUIDE, supra note
34, at 41 (explaining the connection between § 551(2) and FOIA).
37 U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771
(1989) ("[T]he identity of the requesting party [generally] has no bearing on the merits of his
or her FOIA request."); Nat'1 Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004)
("As a general rule, withholding information under FOIA cannot be predicated on the identity
of the requester."); see also Swan v. SEC, 96 F.3d 498, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Whether [a
particular exemption] protects against disclosure to 'any person' is a judgment to be made
without regard to the particular requester's identity."); Durns v. BOP, 804 F.2d 701, 706 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) ("Congress granted the scholar and the scoundrel equal rights of access to agency
records."). See generally DOJ GuDE, supra note 34, at 44 n.104 (collecting cases).
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questing the information needs no preconceived idea of
the uses the data might serve. The information belongs
to citizens to do with as they choose. Furthermore, . . .
the disclosure does not depend on the identity of the re-
quester. As a general rule, if the information is subject
to disclosure, it belongs to all.3 8
However, a requester's right to access an agency record is neither
increased nor decreased based upon her particular interest or need in the
record sought.39 Thus, according to judicial interpretation, neither the
requester's identity nor her purpose for submitting a request is relevant
when determining whether an agency must disclose a requested record.
2. FOIA's Privacy-Related Exemptions Shield Sensitive
Information Where Necessary
While FOIA enabled comprehensive public access to agency
records, Congress recognized that agencies may justifiably shield some
information from the public.40 Accordingly, Congress exempted nine
categories of records from the FOIA's disclosure requirements.4 1 The
exemptions represent "the congressional determination of the types of
information that the Executive Branch must have the option to keep con-
fidential, if it so chooses."142 Through these exemptions, Congress
sought to reach a "'workable balance"' between the public's right to
know and the Government's need to safeguard certain information. 43
The combination of FOIA's broad statutory mandate for disclosure with
these narrow exemptions reflects the balance Congress reached.44 Gen-
38 Favish, 541 U.S. at 172.
39 See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975) (recognizing that
a requester's "rights under the Act are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact
that [she] claims an interest in the [requested records] greater than that shared by the average
member of the public."); see also Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 771 ("As we have repeatedly
stated, Congress clearly intended the FOIA to give any member of the public as much right to
disclosure as one with a special interest [in a particular record].") (alteration in original) (cita-
tions and internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally DOJ GULDE, supra note 34, at 44
n.105 (collecting cases).
40 See Lahr v. NTSB, 569 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2009).
41 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at
771. In addition to the ten exemptions, Congress provided special protection to three addi-
tional categories of records which pertain to especially sensitive federal law enforcement mat-
ters; these records are explicitly excluded from FOIA's scope. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(1),
(c)(2), (c)(3); see also DOJ GuiDE, supra note 34, at 671-80 (explaining the 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)
exceptions).
42 Dep't. of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
43 John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 89-1497, at 6 (1966)).
44 See id. at 153.
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erally, the exemptions direct an agency to withhold particular types of
records if certain conditions are met.4 5
The exemptions, which Congress "explicitly made exclusive,"46
must be narrowly construed 47 "with all doubts resolved in favor of dis-
closure."48 When an agency denies a records request, FOIA permits the
aggrieved requester to file a challenge to the agency's response in a
United States District Court.49 The agency invoking an exemption must
establish that the exemption prevents it from releasing the requested re-
cord,50 and the district court may enjoin the agency from improperly
withholding the records and compel the records' production. 5' Moreo-
ver, if a government employee acts "arbitrarily or capriciously" when
withholding a record, that employee may face disciplinary action.52
If an exemption applies to a requested record, FOIA nevertheless
mandates that "any reasonably segregable portion of [the] record" be dis-
closed.53 Under this partial disclosure requirement, an agency may not
withhold an entire record simply because it contains some exempt infor-
mation,54 rather the agency must redact the exempt material and release
45 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293-94 (1979). The Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552(a), operates in tandem with FOIA to prevent certain privacy-related disclosures.
Specifically, if FOIA permits an agency to withhold information under Exemptions 6 and/or
7(C), the Privacy Act mandates nondisclosure. See News-Press v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 489 F.3d 1173, 1189 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[W]here the FOIA requires disclosure, the Pri-
vacy Act will not stand in its way, but where the FOIA would permit withholding under an
exemption, the Privacy Act makes such withholding mandatory upon the agency.").
46 Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 290 n.9 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)).
47 Milner v. Dep't. of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1262 (2011); see also Rose, 425 U.S. at
361 (emphasizing that the "limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure,
not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act."); News-Press, 489 F.3d at 1191 ("Because
the net effect of the FOIA, with its exemptions, is to place emphasis on the fullest responsible
disclosure, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the policy of the Act requires that the
disclosure requirements be construed broadly, the exemptions narrowly.") (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 151
(1989) ("Consistent with the Act's goal of broad disclosure, these exemptions have been con-
sistently given a narrow compass.").
48 Local 3, IBEW v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 1177, 1180 (2d Cir. 1988).
49 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006); see also EPA v. Mink,
410 U.S. 73, 78 (giving a case example of how the review process might proceed in District
Court).
50 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
51 Id.
52 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F).
53 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) ("Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided
to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under
[one of the nine FOIA exemptions]."); see also DOJ GuimE, supra note 34, at 82 (discussing
partial disclosure requirement); Attorney General Holder's FOIA Memorandum, supra note 8,
at 1 ("Agencies should always be mindful that the FOIA requires them to take reasonable steps
to segregate and release nonexempt information.").
54 Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
("The focus of FOIA is information, not documents, and an agency cannot justify withholding
an entire document simply by showing that it contains some exempt material."); see also
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the non-exempt portions, if reasonably segregable. 55 However, if the
segregation of portions results in "an essentially meaningless set of
words and phrases," such as "disjointed words, phrases, or even
sentences which taken separately or together have minimal or no infor-
mation content," the agency may determine that segregation of those por-
tions is not possible.56
Two FOIA exemptions, Exemptions 6 and 7(C), specifically protect
personal privacy interests.57 Privacy interests in this context, according
to the Supreme Court, generally "encompass the individual's control of
information concerning his or her person."5 8 These privacy-based FOIA
exemptions block the release of government records to prevent unwar-
ranted invasions of privacy.
a) The Exemption 6 Analysis
Exemption 6 protects "personnel and medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy."59 Indeed, the primary concern of Congress in
drafting the exemption was to safeguard the confidentiality of personal
information,60 as Congress intended the exemption to "protect individu-
als from the injury and embarrassment that can result from the unneces-
sary disclosure of personal information." 61  Hence, an agency may
withhold requested information under Exemption 6 only if two require-
ments are met: (1) the information is contained in personnel, medical, or
"similar" files;62 and (2) the information's release would constitute "a
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[A]n entire document is not exempt
merely because an isolated portion need not be disclosed . . .. [T]he agency may not sweep a
document under a general allegation of exemption . . . .").
55 See, e.g., Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
("Before approving the application of a FOIA exemption, the district court must make specific
findings of segregability regarding the documents to be withheld.").
56 Mead Data Cent., Inc., 566 F.2d at 261 & n.55.
57 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (7)(C).
58 U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763
(1989); see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRssION 545 (1970)
("Privacy attempts to draw a line between the individual and the collective, between self and
society. It seeks to assure the individual a zone in which to be an individual, not a member of
the community.").
59 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
60 Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 375 n. 14 (1976).
61 U.S. Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982).
62 See Associated Press v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 554 F.3d 274, 291 (2d Cir. 2009). The
Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning of "similar files" broadly, maintaining that "[t]he
exemption [was] intended to cover detailed Government records on an individual which can be
identified as applying to that individual." Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. at 602 (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 11 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2428); see
also Forest Guardians v. United States FEMA, 410 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Similar
files under Exemption 6 has a broad, rather than a narrow, meaning and encompasses all
information that applies to a particular individual.") (citation and internal quotation marks
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clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 63 Once the threshold
requirement is met (the requested information is in fact kept in a person-
nel, medical, or similar file), courts generally conclude that an agency
faces an "onerous" burden of demonstrating "a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy."64 To assess whether the agency has met this
burden, courts employ a balancing test that weighs the individual's right
to privacy against the public's right to disclosure. 65
Courts initiate this balancing test by examining the privacy right at
issue, ascertaining whether disclosing the requested information would
"compromise a substantial, as opposed to a de minimis, privacy inter-
est."66 A "substantial" privacy interest is "anything greater than a de
minimis privacy interest."67 According to the Supreme Court, the exis-
tence of a privacy interest broadly covers all interests involving "the in-
dividual's control of information concerning his or her person,"68 such as
a citizen's name, address, criminal history, birthdate, employment history
and work history. 69 If the court finds only a de minimis interest, or no
omitted). An example of a "similar file" is an administrative investigative file that contains
information about an individual, such as one's "place of birth, date of birth, date of marriage,
employment history, and comparable data." Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. at 600; see also Wood
v. FBI, 432 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2005) ("In considering whether the information is contained in
a 'similar' file, we ask whether the records at issue are likely to contain the type of personal
information that would be in a medical or personnel file.").
63 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6); see also Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. at 598; Hopkins v. U.S. Dep't
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 929 F.2d 81, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing the balancing test under
Exemption 6).
64 News-Press v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 1173, 1198 (1lth Cir. 2007)
(citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Cochran v. United States, 770 F.2d 949,
955 (11th Cir. 1985) ("If the balance [between an individual's right to privacy and the public's
right to know] is equal the court should tilt the balance in favor of disclosure."); Stern v. FBI,
737 F.2d 84, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing how Exemption 6's language "require[s] a bal-
ance tilted emphatically in favor of disclosure") (citation and internal quotations omitted);
Kurzon v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 649 F.2d 65, 67 (1st Cir. 1981) ("By restricting
the reach of exemption 6 to cases where the invasion of privacy . . . is not only unwarranted
but clearly so, Congress has erected an imposing barrier to nondisclosure under this exemp-
tion.") (emphasis in original).
65 See, e.g., Rose, 425 U.S. at 372-73; 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(B) (requiring the agency to
bear the burden of demonstrating that the application of the exemption is appropriate).
66 Multi Ag Media LLC v. USDA, 515 F.3d 1224, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Nat'1
Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) (internal
quotations omitted).
67 Id. at 1229-30.
68 U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763
(1989).
69 Associated Press v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 549 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Personal
information, including a citizen's name, address, and criminal history, has been found to impli-
cate a privacy interest cognizable under the FOIA exemptions."); People for the Am. Way
Found. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 503 F. Supp. 2d 284, 304 (D.D.C. 2007) ("Federal courts have
previously recognized a privacy interest in a person's name and address.").
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privacy interest at all, its analysis ends, and the FOIA mandates
disclosure.70
If a court finds a substantial privacy interest, it then must weigh the
public interest that disclosure would serve against the substantial privacy
interest to determine if the invasion of privacy is "clearly unwar-
ranted." 7' The public interest under FOIA has been defined singularly as
"the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would 'she[d]
light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties' or otherwise let
citizens know 'what their government is up to.' "72 The requester bears
the burden of demonstrating that disclosing the requested information
would serve this public interest.73 When courts find that the privacy in-
terest outweighs any public interest present, they withhold the requested
information. 74 However, courts have stressed that "under Exemption 6,
the presumption in favor of disclosure is as strong as can be found any-
where in the Act."75
b) The Exemption 7(C) Analysis
The law enforcement counterpart to Exemption 6, Exemption 7(C),
protects personal information contained in law enforcement records from
FOIA disclosure.76 While the exemption excludes all records or infor-
mation compiled for law enforcement purposes, it does so "only to the
extent that the production of such [information] . . . could reasonably be
70 See Multi Ag Media LLC, 515 F.3d at 1229-30.
71 Associated Press, 554 F.3d at 291 (citing Wood v. FBI, 432 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir.
2005)).
72 Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355, 355-56 (1997) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted); see also Associated Press, 554 F.3d at 285 ("[T]he Supreme Court
has made clear that there is only one relevant interest, namely, 'to open agency action to the
light of public scrutiny.'") (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772).
73 See 37A AM. JUR. 2d, Freedom of Information Acts § 246 (2005) (discussing burden).
74 See, e.g., Seized Prop. Recovery Corp. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 502 F. Supp.
2d 50, 56 (D.D.C. 2007) ("If no public interest is found, then withholding the information is
proper, even if the privacy interest is only modest."); News-Press v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 489 F.3d 1173,1205 (1Ith Cir. 2007) ("In order to affirm withholding the addresses, we
would have to find that the privacy interests against disclosure are greater than the public
interest in disclosure.") (emphasis in original).
75 Multi Ag Media LLC, 515 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v.
Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); see also Consumers' Checkbook Ctr. for the Study
of Servs. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 554 F.3d 1046, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
("[FOIA's] presumption favoring disclosure ... is at its zenith under Exemption 6") (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights of S.F. Bay Area v.
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 07-2590, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87624, at *60 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 30, 2008) ("The burden remains on the agency to justify any withholdings under Exemp-
tion 6 since the presumption in favor of disclosure under this exemption is as strong as that
with other exemptions."); DOJ Guioin, supra note 34, at 418 n.6 (collecting cases).
76 See DOJ GUIDE, supra note 34, at 561 (discussing the background and mechanics of
Exemption 7(C)).
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expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."77
The exemption protects any person mentioned in a law enforcement re-
cord, not just the person who is the subject or focus of the law enforce-
ment document.78
When faced with an Exemption 7(C) withholding dispute, courts
first decide whether the information or records withheld were in fact
"compiled for law enforcement purposes." 79 Records "compiled for law
enforcement purposes" include all materials compiled to enforce fed-
eral,80 state,8 local, 82 and foreign83 laws that are in the possession of the
federal government, such as records compiled to document criminal in-
vestigations, audits, or confidential informants. 84 Moreover, "law en-
forcement purposes" pertain to the enforcement of criminal and civil
laws85 and administrative regulations. 86 If the withheld information had
been so compiled at the time the FOIA request was made, 7 courts will
proceed with the Exemption 7(C) analysis.
77 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2006).
78 120 CONG. REc. 17,034 (1974) ("[Exemption 7(C) protects the] privacy of any person
mentioned in the requested files, and not only the person who is the object of the
investigation.").
79 See John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153 (1989) ("Before it may
invoke this [Exemption 7] provision, the Government has the burden of proving the existence
of such a compilation for such a [law enforcement] purpose."). "Compiled" documents in-
volve "materials collected and assembled from various sources or other documents." Id.
80 See, e.g., Wojtczak v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 548 F. Supp. 143, 148 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
("This Court must therefore interpret the statute as written and conclude that Exemption 7
applies to all law enforcement records, federal, state, or local, that lie within the possession of
the federal government.").
81 See DOJ GUIDE, supra note 34, at 497 n.18 (collecting cases).
82 See, e.g., Antonelli v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, No. 04-
1180, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17089, at *12 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2005) ("The withheld records
were compiled during the course of an investigation by a local police department . . . [and so]
[t]hey therefore satisfy the threshold requirement of having been compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes.").
83 See DOJ Guii, supra note 34, at 497 n.19 (collecting cases).
84 See id. at 498-500 (discussing illustrations of records compiled for law enforcement
purposes).
85 See, e.g., Rugiero v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 257 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[Ex-
emption 7] applies not only to criminal enforcement actions, but to records compiled for civil
enforcement purposes as well."); Rural Hous. Alliance v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 498 F.2d 73, 81
n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[L]aw enforcement purposes . . . include both civil and criminal pur-
poses."); see also DOJ GumiE, supra note 34, at 502-03 nn.29-30 (collecting cases).
86 See, e.g., Schoenman v. FBI, 573 F. Supp. 2d 119, 146 (D.D.C. 2008) ("Exemption
7(C) covers investigatory files related to enforcement of all kinds of laws, including those
involving adjudicative proceedings[ ] and administrative matters.") (citation and internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
87 See John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153 ("The objects sought
merely must have been 'compiled' when the Government invokes the Exemption [7(C)]."); see
also Lion Raisins v. USDA, 354 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Information need not have
been originally compiled for law enforcement purposes in order to qualify for the 'law en-
forcement' exemption, so long as it was compiled for law enforcement at the time the FOIA
request was made.").
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Once courts find that the requested material meets the threshold re-
quirement, they then employ a balancing test, akin to the Exemption 6
test, which weighs the privacy right against the public's right to be in-
formed.88 The privacy interests in this context are typically strong; as
courts recognize that individuals referenced in law enforcement files face
potential stigma, reputational damage and harassment upon the files' re-
lease.89 In contrast, to satisfy the public interest requirement, the re-
quested material must uncover information about the government's
actions and procedures. 90 With such dynamics at play, some courts have
weighed in favor of privacy rights and refused to grant the release of the
requested information in Exemption 7(C) balancing test disputes.9 '
B. State Freedom of Information Acts
In unison with the federal government, all fifty states have enacted
their own version of a freedom of information act, 92 bestowing public
access to much of their internal documents.93 These state statutes largely
share the same function and purpose as the FOIA, with a number of the
88 See supra Part I.A.2.a (discussing the FOIA Exemption 6 balancing test).
89 See generally Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("It is surely
beyond dispute that the mention of an individual's name in a law enforcement file will engen-
der comment and speculation and carries a stigmatizing connotation.") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
90 See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
772-73 (1989) (recognizing that only "[o]fficial information that sheds light on an agency's
performance of its statutory duties" qualifies as public interest for an Exemption 7(C) exemp-
tion analysis); see also Dickinson, supra note 4, at 206-11 (criticizing as flawed the Supreme
Court's reading of the public interest served by FOIA).
91 See DOJ GUIDE, supra note 34, at 592-93 (discussing requesters' failure to satisfy
public interest requirement and collecting cases). A requester faces greater difficulty in ob-
taining a record protected by Exemption 7(C) compared to one protected by Exemption 6,
largely because Exemption 7(C)'s privacy language as drafted is more expansive. Exemption
6's requirement that a privacy invasion being "clearly unwarranted" is absent from Exemption
7(C), thus easing the burden to justify withholding. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 756. More-
over, Exemption 6 addresses disclosures that "would constitute" an invasion of privacy, creat-
ing a higher burden for an agency to meet when compared to Exemption 7(C)'s language
encompassing any disclosure that "could reasonably be expected to constitute" such an inva-
sion. Id. at 756 & n.9. These drafting differences are the product of Congress' deliberate
decision to provide agencies with greater freedom to protect privacy interests implicated in
records compiled for law enforcement purposes. Id. (analyzing Congressional effort to pro-
vide greater privacy protection under Exemption 7(C)).
92 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.231 et seq. (2012) (Michigan's "Freedom of Infor-
mation Act"); N.Y. Pun. OiF. LAW § 85 et seq. (McKinney 2011) (New York's "Freedom of
Information Law"). These statutes are also known as open records acts or right to know laws.
See, e.g., Ky. Ri-v. STAT. ANN§ 61.870 et seq. (West 2012) (Kentucky "Open Records Act");
65 PA. CONs. STAT. § 67.101 (West 2012) ("This act shall be known and may be cited as the
[Pennsylvania] Right-to-Know Law").
93 See generally Bruce D. Goldstein, Confidentiality and Dissemination of Personal In-
formation: An Examination of State Laws Governing Data Protection, 41 EMORY L.J. 1185
(1992) (examining the individual freedom of information acts for the fifty states). The District
of Columbia and Puerto Rico also have their own freedom of information acts. See id. at 1218,
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state statutes modeling the FOIA's structure and content.94 For instance,
the statutes generally seek to promote government transparency through
information disclosure, 95 and courts in general interpret the statutes' ex-
pansive language broadly in favor of government openness. 96 While
some state freedom of information statutes grant more extensive access
than others,97 all of the statutes function similarly.
Every state exempts certain categories of information from its free-
dom of information act disclosures,98 and a number of state freedom of
information act exemptions mirror those within the FOIA.99 Moreover,
state governments have echoed the Congressional mandate that exemp-
tions to disclosure should be narrowly construed.100 The state freedom
of information act exemptions generally contain privacy protections,10
1220; 37A AM. JUR. 2o Freedom of Information Acts § 2 (2011) (providing overview of state
freedom of information laws).
94 See, e.g., San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 762, 772 (Cal.
1982) ("The [California Public Records] Act, modeled after the 1967 federal Freedom of In-
formation Act (FOIA), can draw on its federal counterpart for judicial construction and legisla-
tive history."); Barry v. Wash. Post Co., 529 A.2d 319, 321 (D.C. 1987) ("The District of
Columbia FOIA was modeled on the corresponding federal statute, and many of its provisions
closely parallel those of the federal act.") (internal citations omitted); Suffolk Constr. Co. v.
Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 870 N.E.2d 33, 41 (Mass. 2007) (noting that the Massachusetts
Public Records Law was "[m]odeled after the Federal Freedom of Information Act").
95 See, e.g., Better Gov't Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 899 N.E.2d 382, 391 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)
("Our legislature enacted the FOIA in recognition that: (1) blanket government secrecy does
not serve the public interest; and (2) transparency should be the norm, except in rare, specified
circumstances.").
96 See, e.g., Dade Aviation Consultants v. Knight Ridder, Inc., 800 So. 2d 302, 304 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that Florida's Public Records Act should be construed liberally
in favor of openness and that when in doubt a court should find in favor of disclosure).
97 See, e.g., Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Att'y Gen. of Tex., 354 S.W.3d 336,
359 (Tex. 2010) ("Relative to other freedom of information laws, such as FOIA, the Texas
[Public Information Act] more strongly favors transparency and open government.").
98 Many states provide exemptions either statutorily-within their particular freedom of
information laws or elsewhere in their statutory codes-or through their common law. See,
e.g., Hathaway v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, 342 N.W.2d 682, 687 (Wis. 1984) ("[Plublic records
shall be open to the public unless there is a clear statutory exception, unless there exists a
limitation under the common law, or unless there is an overriding public interest in keeping the
public record confidential.").
99 See, e.g., Mans v. Lebanon Sch. Bd., 290 A.2d 866, 867 (N.H. 1972) ("The exemption
provisions of our right-to-know law are similar to the Federal Freedom of Information Act.")
(citations omitted); Sattler v. Holliday, 318 S.E.2d 50, 51 (W. Va. 1984) ("The exemptions in
our statute are similar to those in the federal Freedom of Information Act and other state
acts.") (citation omitted).
In0 See, e.g., CAL. CONsr., art. 1, § 3, div. (b) subdiv. (2) ("A statute, court rule, or other
authority, including those in effect on the effective date of this subdivision, shall be broadly
construed if it furthers the people's right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right
of access."); see also Young v. Rice, 826 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Ark. 1992) (holding that any
exemption from the state's FOIA must be narrowly construed).
101 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 93, at 1185-95 & n.2 (discussing the state FOIA pri-
vacy-related exemptions).
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including exemptions pertaining to medical and personnel records10 2 as
well as law enforcement records.103 Several of these exemptions emulate
both FOIA's Exemptions 6104 and 7(C),105 respectively. In addition,
some states have adopted a balancing test analysis, similar to that used in
FOIA cases, in order to examine public and privacy interests in conflict
and resolve withholding disputes involving these types of exemptions.106
II. GOVERNMENT AGENCY RECORDS DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL
DEATHS: AN OVERVIEW OF DEATH RECORD LAW
Every death in the United States carries legal implications that ne-
cessitate government involvement. After someone dies, government
agencies at every level may be actively involved in responding to the
death. For example, the local emergency dispatcher may send the county
coroner to the decedent's home, the county social services agency may
cease providing monthly assistance, the state revenue department and the
Internal Revenue Service may assess estate taxes upon the decedent's
estate, and the Veteran's Administration may terminate the provision of
benefits.
Government agencies may also pursue investigations surrounding
the causes and circumstances of one's death, and create investigatory
files, take photographs, draft reports and compile medical documents as
part of the investigation. The agencies' activities will inevitably leave a
document trail, and the amount and types of records created will depend
upon the scope of the government's investigation. This Part provides a
brief overview of medical-legal death reporting systems in the United
102 See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-203(d) (2012) (exempting medical and personnel
records from public disclosure); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-10 (West 2012) (same).
103 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 6254(f) (West 2012) (exempting law enforcement
records from state freedom of information act); see also Sarah Henderson Hutt, In Praise of
Public Access: Why the Government Should Disclose the Identities of Alleged Crime Victims,
41 DUKE L.J. 368, 383-84 (1991) ("[T]he majority of state freedom of information acts con-
tain specific exemptions for [law enforcement] records .. .. Many of the states without spe-
cific exemptions either classify law enforcement records as confidential in other sections of
their code, or have case law .. . constru[ing] such records as exempt from disclosure.").
104 See Andrea G. Nadel, What Constitutes Personal Matters Exempt from Disclosure by
Invasion of Privacy Exemption under State Freedom of Information Act, 26 A.L.R.4th 666, at
§ 2(a) ("A majority of state freedom of information laws include some form of privacy exemp-
tion, and, with few exceptions, the exemptions closely track the Federal Freedom of Informa-
tion Act's sixth exemption.").
105 See 37A Am. JUR. 2d Freedom of Information Acts § 278 (2011) ("State freedom of
information laws may contain exemptions for information compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses that are modeled on, or similar to, Exemption 7 of the FOIA.").
106 See, e.g., Mulgrew v. Bd. of Educ. of the City School Dist. of New York, 919
N.Y.S.2d 786, 790 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (using "a balancing test in which the privacy interests at
stake are balanced against the public interest in disclosure of the information." (internal quota-
tions omitted)).
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States, their relevant procedures, and the government documentation they
generate.
A. Death Certificates: The Quintessential Death Record
Roughly 1 percent of the United States population (about 2.6 mil-
lion people) dies annually in the United States,107 with most dying either
in a hospital, a nursing home facility, or at home. 08 At or shortly after
the moment of death, an attending physician, coroner or medical exam-
iner may pronounce the death officially, pursuant to the local jurisdic-
tion's requirements.109 State law also mandates the filing of a death
certificate shortly after death.
Every state requires the registration of any death within its borders
through the creation of a death certificate.o10 A death certificate is both a
permanent legal record' and a core component of the vital registration
107 Sherry L. Murphy et al., Death: Preliminary Data for 2010, vol. 60 no. 4 NATIONAIL
VIrAL STrATIsrICs REoRTS, at 6 (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr60/
nvsr6004.pdf; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNIrED STATE-s: A PATH FORWARD 244 (2009) ("About I percent of the U.S. population
(about 2.6 million people) dies each year.") [hereinafter STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE).
108 Press Release, CDC, New Study of Patterns of Death in the United States (Feb. 23,
1998), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/98facts/93nmfs.htm. Depending upon the circum-
stances, a caregiver or witness may call 911, a funeral director, or the local coroner's office to
remove the decedent from the place of death for transportation to a funeral home, coroner's
office or local mortuary. See, e.g., Quick Answers-Death in Your Family, http://
www.funeralwise.com/answers/someone-died (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (discussing "who to
call when someone dies" and "transporting the body").
109 Procedures for the official pronouncement of death are determined by statute. See,
e.g., GA. CoDn ANN. § 31-10-16(a) (2011) (criteria for determining death); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 333.1033 (West Supp. 2012) (same). Typically the statutes call for a licensed physi-
cian or registered nurse to make a medical determination that an individual is dead. See, e.g.,
NEv. REV. STAT. § 440.415(7)(d) (2008) ("'Pronouncement of death' means a declaration of
the time and date when the cessation of the cardiovascular and respiratory functions of a
patient occurs as recorded in the patient's medical record by the attending provider of health
care."). A pronouncement of death is a separate process from a certification of death; the
pronouncement of death typically comprises a section of information within the certificate of
death. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 7-211(i) (2001) ("Each death certificate shall contain a pro-
nouncement of death section.").
I10 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.230(a) (2012) ("A death certificate for each death
that occurs in the state shall be filed with the local registrar . . . ."); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-
62b(a) (2012) ("A death certificate for each death which occurs in this state shall be ... filed
with the registrar of vital statistics . . . ."); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 16, § 3123(a) (2011) ("A
certificate of death for each death which occurs in this State shall be filed with the Office of
Vital Statistics."); IOWA CODE § 144.26.1 (2011) ("A death certificate for each death which
occurs in this state shall be filed as directed by the state registrar."); MONr. CODE ANN. § 50-
15-403(2) (2011) ("The person in charge of disposition ... shall . . . file the death or fetal
death certificate with the local registrar .... .").
I I See, e.g., GA. CoOL ANN. § 31-10-15 (2011) ("The [county] custodian of records shall
file such death certificate as a part of the permanent records of such office.").
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system in the United States.1 2 Most states direct the attending physi-
cian, coroner, medical examiner, or funeral director" 3 to enter vital in-
formation and sign and file the certificate with the local health
department within a specified period of time, usually within three to five
days of the decedent's passing.' 14 The filer typically files the death cer-
tificate in the local jurisdiction where the death transpired or where the
decedent's body was found.'" 5
The death certificate can be highly valuable to public and private
interests due in part to the medical information it contains. Individual
state statutes generally instruct a physician to input and certify the medi-
cal section within the death certificate,"l 6 and as these medical certifi-
ers' " complete the section, they identify the deceased and input
1 12 See CDC CORONIERs' HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 4 ("The registration of deaths ... is
a State function supported by individual State laws and regulations."). Every state bears the
responsibility to issue and maintain death certificates as part of its vital records system. See
Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 767 (2008) (discussing vital records
system); James A. Weed, Vital Statistics in the United States: Preparing for the Next Century,
61 POPULATION INDEX 527, 527 (1995) (discussing vital records system).
1 13 Funeral directors typically complete death certificates. Non-medical sections are com-
pleted with input from those closest to the decedent. See CDC CORONERs' HANDBOOK, supra
note 9, at 9. Medical personnel, coroners, or medical examiners typically complete the medi-
cal portions of the certificates. See infra note 114. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:34(B)(2)(r) (2012) ("In the absence of a physician, the parish coroner shall sign the
[death] certificate.").
114 See, e.g., Ai.A. CODE § 22-9A-14(a) (2011) ("A certificate of death ... shall be filed
... within five days of the death."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2412(a) (2011) ("A death certifi-
cate . . . shall be filed . . . within three days after such death."). Each state uses its own
prescribed death certificate form, with most mimicking the US Standard Certificate of Death
model certificate. See, e.g., Nuv. REv. STAT. § 440.350 (2011) (adopting the US standard
death certificate form); Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, U.S. Standard Death Certificate (1989),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/std-dcrt.pdf [hereinafter Death Certificate].
1 15 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-15(a) (2011) ("A certificate of death ... shall be
filed with the local registrar of the county in which the death occurred or the body was
found."); IowA COD. § 144.26.3 (2011) ("The county in which a dead body is found is the
county of death.").
116 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-9A- 14(a) (2012) ("The completion of the medical certifica-
tion of cause of death on the death certificate by the physician ... shall constitute authoriza-
tion."); CAL-. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 102825 (West 2012) ("[T]he physician. . . . [of] a
deceased person shall state on the [death] certificate . . . any . . . medical and health section
data as may be required on the certificate."); INo. CoDE § 16-37-3-5 (2012) (physician to
certify cause of death upon the death certificate). Commentators have reflected that the attend-
ing physician's completion of the death certificate is the last act of patient care that a physician
performs for her patient. See DEff. HEALTH & HUMAN SnRvS., PuB. No. (PHS) 2003-1108,
PHYSICIAN'S HANDBOOK ON MEDICAL CERTIFICATION OF DEATH 4 (2003) [hereinafter CDC
PHYSICIAN'S HANDBOOK].
'17 The attending physician is typically the certifier of death; when the attending physi-
cian is unavailable, the medical examiner usually certifies. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 58.720(4) (2011) ("The medical examiner shall certify the cause of death in any case where
death occurred without medical attendance or where an attending physician refuses to sign a
certificate of death."). The certifier attests that, to the best of his or her knowledge, the dece-
dent died of the cause(s) and circumstances reported on the certificate. See, e.g., WASH. REV.
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information concerning the causes and circumstances surrounding the
death.1s For instance, the certifier will specify the immediate cause of
death and describe any underlying, contributing medical factors that ulti-
mately led to the person's death.1 9 The certifier then draws conclusions
to form a manner-of-death classification,120 which classifies the death
according to certain statutorily delineated' 21 categories. Options for
classification include natural, accident, suicide, homicide or undeter-
mined death.122 Beyond the medical information it proffers, the certifi-
cate collects additional vital information, such as the decedent's age,
race, gender, and education, and the time and place of death.123
To some, the death certificate is "the most important legal document
in existence." 24 It serves several legal purposes. Functioning as legiti-
mate proof of death, it legally changes one's status from living to
dead.125 Consequently, private parties use the certificate to facilitate set-
tlement of the decedent's estate, to transfer real or personal property, to
CoiE § 70.58.170 (2012) (stating that the certifier must "certify the cause of death according
to his or her best knowledge and belief.").
118 Nat'I Ass'n of Med. Exam'r, Guide for Manner of Death Classification (2002), http://
thename.org/index.php?option=com docman&task=cat.view&gid=38&Itemid=26 [hereinaf-
ter NAME Guide].
1 19 The CDC defines the "cause of death" as either "the disease or injury that initiated the
train of morbid events leading directly to death, or . . . the circumstances of the accident or
violence that produced the fatal injury." CDC PHYSICIAN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 116, at 10.
The medical certifier will specify the immediate cause of death (the "final disease, injury or
complication directly causing death") and the underlying cause of death ("the disease or injury
that initiated the chain of events that led directly and inevitably to death"). Id. The medical
certifier must list all other major diseases, conditions and injuries that contributed to death as
well. CDC CORONERS' HANonOK, supra note 9, at 12.
120 NAME Guide, supra note 118, at 5.
121 See S.C. Coon ANN. § 17-5-5(9) (2011) ("'Manner of death' refers to the means or
fatal agency that caused a death. Manner of death is classified in one of the five following
categories: A. natural, B. accident, C. homicide, D. suicide, and E. undetermined"); NAME
Guide, supra note 118, at 3. Certifiers aim to be objective while completing manner of death
determinations, but such determinations nevertheless represent the certifier's opinions. NAME
Guide, supra note 118, at 4. Because manner-of-death determinations have an element of
subjectivity, certifiers are warned that "[m]anner-of-death classification should not be formu-
lated on the basis of trying to facilitate prosecution, avoiding challenging publicity, building a
political base, or promoting a personal philosophy or agenda." Id. at 6.
122 NAME Guide, supra note 118, at 3. The cause and manner of death information have
quasi-judicial elements and so in completing the certificate, the certifier has "quasi-judicial
responsibility derived from the enabling law in the [certifier's] relevant jurisdiction." Id. at 8.
The medical section has additional questions beyond causes and manner of death that relate to
the existence of any injuries and whether an autopsy was performed. CDC CORONERS' HAND-
BOOK, supra note 9, at 11.
123 See Death Certificate, supra note 114.
124 See Documenting Death-The Certificate, FROrLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/post-mortem/things-to-know/death-certificates.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
125 See People (In re Interest of E.W. and R.W), 780 P.2d 32, 33-34 (Colo. App. 1989)
(affirming the admission of death certificate where certificate "was submitted to corroborate
trial testimony that [a particular individual] was dead."); NAME Guide, supra note 118, at 4.
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apply for insurance benefits, and for other affairs. 126 The government
also uses the information as the basis to assess taxes, terminate benefits,
and carry out other administrative functions. 12 7 Moreover, by identifying
the medical circumstances surrounding the death, the document may
"provide family members closure, peace of mind, and documentation of
the cause of death."1 2 8 Beyond its legal and medical importance, a death
certificate carries genealogical,12 9 statistical,o30 and research 13 1 value.
Once filed, the certificates become part of the state's official records of
death.132
B. Documenting beyond the Death Certificate: The Role of Forensic
Death Investigations and Autopsy Reports
If an individual's death does not appear to be the result of natural
causes, concerned parties may contact the local medical-legal death in-
vestigation office, which examines certain types of deaths to discern
whether criminal laws have been broken or public health or safety issues
exist.13 3 A "medical-legal officer," 3 4 either a coroner or medical exam-
126 See, e.g., Connecticut Probate Courts, Guidelines for Administration of Decedents'
Estates, 4 (2012), http://www.jud.ct.gov/probate/GuideDecEstate.pdf (illustrating that a death
certificate may be necessary for settling a decedent's estate and related activities); see also
Judith S. Kaye, The Legal Community's Response to 9/11: Public Service in a Time of Crisis,
31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 870-71 (2004) (explaining that "almost every aspect of. . . legal
and financial recovery" after the death of a loved one requires a death certificate). "Insurance
companies insist on a death certificate before making payment on . .. policies; banks require a
death certificate before allowing [account] access . . . ; governments require death certificates
before transferring title to property; wills cannot be probated, or asset distributed, without a
death certificate." Id.
127 See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Form 706, 3 (2011), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f706_10.pdf (requiring death certificate to be attached to Form 706
for filing). A death certificate once certified may also function legally as prima facie evidence
of all facts contained within the certificate. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 191.052 (West 2012) ("A copy of a birth, death, or fetal death record registered under this
title that is certified by the state registrar is prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the
record.").
128 CDC CORONERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 9 at 2.
129 See CDC CORONERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 2-5; What Is Genealogy ?, BRIrISH
COLUMBIA VITAL STATIsTrIcs AGENCY, http://www.vs.gov.bc.ca/genealogy/what is geneal-
ogy.html (Apr. 9, 2012) (describing genealogical purposes of death certificates).
130 Death certificates contain data crucial for generating mortality statistics that may be
used to assess health at local, regional, state and national levels. See CDC CORONERS' HAND-
BOOK, supra note 9, at 2 (describing mortality statistics).
131 Death certificates offer a host of research possibilities. For instance, researches may
systematically catalogue causes of morbidity and mortality, and public health officials may
develop funding priorities and public health and safety programs based upon research results
that use data pulled from death certificates. See CDC CORONERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 9 at
2. Research projects using death certificates may, inter alia, analyze health statuses at local,
state and national levels. Id.
132 See supra text accompanying note 114 (describing death certificate filing procedures).
133 CDC CORONERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 1.
134 Id.
258 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 22:237
iner, manages these offices, as directed by state statute.'3 5 Coroners and
medical examiners (C/MEs) 136 are public officers who function as medi-
cal detectives by performing investigative services pertaining to the de-
ceased.137 They may physically examine the dead and commence an
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death if certain con-
ditions are present. They may also respond to and investigate all deaths
relating to hazards, including terrorism and mass fatality events, and the
identification of the unidentified dead. 138 They assume jurisdiction over
these and other types of deaths, as defined by statute.139 Medical and
law enforcement personnel refer approximately one million death cases
to C/ME offices nationally, which constitute approximately 40 percent of
all deaths in the United States. 140
C/MEs are required by statute to investigate and determine the
cause(s) of death where needed, and they must specify whether the inves-
tigated death was due to unnatural causes. 141 Conducting an autopsy, an
internal and external examination of the decedent's body, is a crucial part
135 See NAT'L Ass'N OF MED. EXAM'R, MEDICAL-LEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION (2003),
http://thename.org/index.php?option=comdocman&task=cat-view&gid=38&Itemid=26
("Every state has a Medical-Legal Death Investigation system in place. It may be statewide,
regional or county based."). Roughly 2,400 C/ME offices provide investigation services
across the country. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 107, at 243.
136 Local governments investigate deaths by either using a medical examiner system or a
coroner system. The coroner system is the older, more traditional system, whereas the medical
examiner system is the more modern and professional system. Both systems work in conjunc-
tion with local law enforcement agencies to investigate deaths. See LAWYERS' MEDICAL
CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 11, § 32A. 1 a (detailing differences between coroners and medical
examiners); STRINGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 107, at 245 (same).
137 See Sizemore v. West Jefferson Gen. Hosp, 260 So. 2d 800, 802 (La. Ct. App. 1972)
("[T]he Coroner's primary duty is to determine the possibility of violations of criminal law or
of the existence of public health hazards in certain cases of death.").
138 The scope of death investigation services are statutorily defined and may include
"death scene investigations, medical investigations, reviews of medical records, medicolegal
autopsies, determination of the cause and manner of death, and completion of the certificate of
death." STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 107, at 243. C/MEs' responsibilities
include: (1) identifying and documenting pathologic findings in suspicious or violent deaths;
(2) testifying as expert medical witnesses in court; (3) "surveil[ing] for index cases of infection
or toxicity that may herald biological or chemical terrorism"; (4) identifying diseases with
epidemic potential; and (5) documenting injury trends. Id. at 244.
139 See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 107, at 244 ("Classes may include
deaths resulting from injury, such as by violence or by poisoning; by circumstance, such as
related to fire or under anesthesia; by decedent status, such as prisoners or mental health pa-
tients; or by time-frame, such as deaths that occur within 24 hours of admission to a
hospital.").
140 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MEDICAL EXAMINERS AND CORONERS' OFFICES,
2004, at 1 (2007). The ME/C offices conduct additional investigations on roughly half of all
cases referred to it, screening out and resolving the others without further examination. Id.
After investigation, roughly 40 to 50 percent will be attributed to natural causes, 27 to 40
percent to accident, 12 to 15 percent to suicide, 7 to 10 percent to homicide, and 1 percent as
undetermined. STRENGT-HENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, Supra note 107, at 244.
141 18 AM. JUR. 2d Coroners or Medical Examiners § 7 (2004).
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of the process.142 C/MEs must draft and file autopsy reports that docu-
ment conclusive findings from their investigations as to the true cause of
death.143 C/MEs have a statutory duty to file an autopsy report, as a
certified written record of their examinations, when investigating certain
types of deaths, such as when a death appears unexplained, violent, unu-
sual or suspicious, or when a body is mysteriously found.14 4 The au-
topsy report functions as an official, in-depth report of the cause of death.
The C/MEs are required to draft these reports "for the welfare of society
and in the interest of public justice."' 45
III. AN ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO
PUBLIC DEMANDS FOR DEATH RECORD ACCESS: CONFLICTING LAWS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Members of the public may wish to access government files that
document individual deaths, for numerous reasons, and their document
requests raise an overarching legal question that looms over the govern-
ment's entire death investigation process: should the public have access
to records which document and investigate an individual's death? His-
torically, death records, particularly death certificates and autopsy re-
ports, were open to the public for inspection. In recent years,
jurisdictions have split in their approaches, with some continuing to pro-
vide open access, others blocking public access entirely, citing privacy
concerns, and still others releasing or withholding requested death
records after weighing the particular public benefits and privacy interests
pertinent to each request.
This Part explores the tension between public demands to access,
through freedom of information act requests, government agency records
that address an individual's death and the privacy rights afforded to the
decedent and his or her family. Focusing on public access to death cer-
tificates and autopsy reports, this Part analyzes legislative and judicial
responses to public access demands for these types of records, and rec-
142 An autopsy is "the systematic external and internal examination of a body to establish
the presence or absence of disease by gross and microscopic examination of body tissues."
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 107, at 248. In addition to determining the
cause and manner of death, autopsies are conducted to "collect medical evidence that may be
useful for public health or the courts; and develop information that may be useful for recon-
structing how the person received a fatal injury." Id.
143 See Michele Goodwin, Rethinking Legislative Consent Law?, 5 DEPAUt J. HEALTH
CARE L. 257, 272 n.71 (2002) (listing typical components of autopsy statutes).
144 Additional examples include all deaths where criminal violence appears to have taken
place, suicides, deaths following an unlawful abortion, deaths related to occupational illness or
injury, death in any correctional facility or mental health institution, death due to poison or
substance abuse, accidents. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 38, § 3 (2011) (defining circum-
stances requiring notification of medical examiner).
145 LeJeune v. Causey, 634 So. 2d 34, 37 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
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ommends particular reforms to reshape the current set of death record
access laws, so that these laws more effectively serve the public interest.
A. Public Access to Death Certificates
1. Death Certificate Access: Legislative Treatment
State public health laws govern the maintenance of death certifi-
cates as part of a larger vital records system. 146 Every state has a set of
laws that controls the form, content, use and accessibility of any death
certificates generated.147 This area of jurisprudence is uniquely state-
based, as the federal government does not issue death certificates.14 8
When crafting and maintaining its vital records system, each state inevi-
tably faces the issue of access and must decide whether to treat death
certificates as either public records that are open to inspection and copy-
ing under its freedom of information law, or as confidential records that
are off-limits to the general public.
Historically, many states began officially issuing death certificates
in the 19th century,149 and for decades thereafter, the states generally
treated death certificates as public records that were open for the public
to inspect and receive copies at the local county clerk's office.o50 This
practice was part of a common law right to inspect public documents.' 5'
As states began to ratify freedom of information acts, the long-time prac-
tice of granting public access to death certificates harmonized with the
government transparency principles inherent in the public access laws.
Beginning roughly in the 1970s, 152 a growing number of states en-
acted laws that restrict access to death certificates and other vital records
146 See Mo. CooE ANN., HEALTH-GHN. §§ 4-201 to 212 (LexisNexis 2011) (exemplifying
a set of laws that governs a state's vital records system).
147 See MI). Co)IE ANN., HEAi rH-GEN. § 4-212 (LexisNexis 2011) (exemplifying statu-
tory law governing death certificates).
148 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INDICATORS FOR CHRONIc DISEASE SUR-
VEILLANCE (Sept. 10, 2004) ("In the United States, state laws require death certificates to be
completed for all deaths . . . .").
149 See, e.g., KING COUNTY ARCHIVES, Historical King County Death Records (Dec. 1,
2011), http://www.kingcounty.gov/operations/archives/vital/death.aspx; MISSOURI SECRETARY
OF STATE, Missouri Vital Records, http://www.sos.mo.gov/archives/resources/bdrecords.asp
(last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
150 See State v. Pabst, 121 N.W. 351, 360 (Wis. 1909) ("A death certificate . . . is made a
public record . . . . [and] [ilts contents are published to the world and are no longer treated as
privileged."); Robinson v. Supreme Commandery, 77 N.Y.S. 111, 144 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902)
(death certificates are made public by statute); see also 88 Op. N.H. Att'y Gen. 39, 1988 N.H.
AG LEXIS 24, at *4 (Aug. 16, 1988) ("In New Hampshire, death certificates have long been
subject to inspection and copying for legitimate purposes.")
151 See Home News v. State, Dep't of Health, 677 A.2d 195, 198 (N.J. 1996) (reviewing
the common-law right to inspect public documents and its application to death certificates).
152 See, e.g., Eugene Cervi & Co. v. Russell, 519 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Colo. 1974) (holding
that Colorado law permits the release of a death certificate only to qualified individuals); State
v. Jacobus, 348 N.Y.S.2d 907, 913 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (noting that under New York law, the
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by removing them from the public's reach.' 53 Under these laws, only
certain categories of individuals, such as the deceased's next-of-kin, may
access a given death certificate on file with the state.154 Many state leg-
islatures have provided vague justifications for these laws through proc-
lamations that they enacted the laws "to protect the integrity of vital
records, to insure their proper use, and to insure the efficient proper ad-
ministration of the system of vital statistics."' 5 5 Other states have ex-
plained more directly their reasons for enacting the laws, positing that the
laws are to "provide for adequate standards of security and confidential-
ity of vital records." 156
Presently, state legislatures take three differing approaches to ena-
bling public access to death certificates: they provide full, partial, or no
access to the public. Approximately ten states (open-access states) con-
tinue to grant full public access to death certificates, disclosing the certif-
icates in their entirely.' 57 These open-access states view access to death
certificates as a right held by the general public, pursuant to specific
statutory decree 58 and reinforced through state freedom of information
legislation.1 59 The open-access states treat death certificates as public
records and require their disclosure upon request, as directed by the state
freedom of information laws and their underlying, open government pub-
lic policies.160
issuance of copies of death certificates is "limited to those showing some interest entitling
them to receive such documents").
153 See Yeste v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 451 So. 2d 491, 492 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that FLA. STAT. § 382.35(4) (1983) prohibits public access to certain portions of death
certificates); see also 91 Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 25, 1991 Ky. AG LEXIS 25, at *3 (Feb. 8, 1991)
("Until recently, birth and death certificates . . . have been considered public records which
were open for public inspection . . .").
154 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §5-C:9 (2012) (explaining that death certificates may
only be released to applicants with a "direct and tangible interest" in the document).
155 IOWA CODE § 144.43.1 (2011). See also ALA. CODE § 22-9A-21 (2011); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 63 § 1-323.A (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-3-23(a) (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-271.A
(2011).
156 TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-205(a)(2) (2011). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 3110(a) (2011); OR. REV. SrAT. § 432.121(1) (2009).
157 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 130(h) (West 2012) (death certificates are publicly ac-
cessible documents); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-25(f) (2011) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 333.2882(c) (2012) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-15-121(4) (2011) (same); NEv. REV.
STAT. § 440.650.1 (2011) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-99(a) (2011) (same); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3705.23(A)(1) (2012) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-27-1.5(2) (2011) (same);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.58.104(1) (2012). See also WIScONSIN DEPARIMENT OF HEALTH SER-
VICES, Request for a Death Certificate (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/
vitalrecords/death.htm (proclaiming that a "copy of a death certificate is available to anyone
who applies").
158 See id. (exemplifying statutory provisions specifically granting public access to death
certificates).
159 See, e.g., 2007 Op. Ga. Att'y Gen. 4 (July 11, 2007) (justifying state's death certificate
access law as part of state open records act).
160 See Soc'y of Prof'1 Journalists v. Sexton, 324 S.E.2d 313, 315 (S.C. 1984).
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The partial-access approach grants public access only to the non-
medical portions of the death certificates, shielding any medical informa-
tion within the certificates under a privacy cloak. Approximately three
states have adopted this bifurcated approach, withholding the death cer-
tificate's medical information by statute,161 but disclosing the remaining
information upon request through the states' freedom of information
laws. 162 The partial-access states' reasoning is straightforward: medical
information "represents sensitive and generally private information [that]
[i]f made public, . . . could cause public embarrassment to the deceased's
family."l 63 States following this approach grant only certain family
members, those with an interest in the decedent's estate, and their legal
representatives the ability to view the confidential portions of a dece-
dent's death certificate.164
The closed-access approach flatly prohibits public access to death
certificates in their entirety. Over thirty states have adopted this ap-
proach by enacting statutes that specifically exempt death certificates
from the state freedom of information laws.165 These statutes, in effect,
mechanically separate death certificates from other public records' 66 by
eliminating the possibility of obtaining a death certificate through the
state freedom of information request process.167 As in the partial-access
approach, legislators adopting a closed-access approach have largely
161 See FLA. STAT. § 382.008(6) (2012) ("All information relating to cause of death in all
death . . . records . . . [is] confidential and exempt from [state public access laws]."); INo.
CoDE § 16-37-3-9 (2011) (opening to public inspection only non-medical information within
death certificates); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 23-02.1-27 (2011) (providing that death records are
confidential).
162 See FLA. STAT. § 382.025(2)(a) (2012) (permitting public access to non-medical por-
tion of death certificates); INo. CoDE § 16-37-3-9(b) (declaring death certificates' non-medical
information "shall be open to public inspection"); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 23-02.1-27.2 (permit-
ting public access to "informational death record[s]" that do not contain the decedent's cause
of death).
163 Yeste v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 451 So. 2d 419, 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
164 See FLA. STAT. § 382.025(2)(a)(1) (listing categories of persons entitled to access con-
fidential portions of death certificates); INo. CoDE § 16-37-1-8(a) (2011) (listing determina-
tions the local health officer must make before issuing a death certificate).
165 See, e.g., Tux. Gov'T Como ANN. § 552.115(a) (West 2012) (stating that death certifi-
cates are confidential records that are exempt from state's freedom of information require-
ments and consequently may not be disclosed to the public); CONN. GEN. STAr. § 7-51a(a)
(2012) (providing that certain death records may be released to researchers and genealogists);
UTAH CODE. ANN. § 26-2-22(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2012) (providing that copies of "vital records"
are only issued to a party with a "direct, tangible, and legitimate interest").
166 See infra note 198 and accompanying text (defining "public record").
167 See Wharten, 63 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 659, 666 (1978) (holding that state freedom of
information law "cannot be used as a vehicle for disclosure of ... death certificates where
disclosure is not permitted under the particular statutory provisions applicable to them.").
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cited confidentiality concerns as the impetus for enacting these restrictive
laws.168
States following the closed-access approach have authorized only
limited categories of eligible persons to inspect and receive copies of
death certificates under procedures that exist outside of the state freedom
of information system.' 6 9 Closed-access statutes typically restrict death
certificate access to specified "eligible parties"o70 or those who have "a
direct and tangible interest"' 71 in the certificate. Who qualifies as "eligi-
ble" to access a certificate or as having the requisite interest in the certifi-
cate varies considerably from state to state. Virtually all closed-access
statutes deem spouses, children, parents, their legal representatives, and
those with a court order to qualify,172 but how far the statutes expand
their definitions of qualified persons beyond these categories of people
differs significantly among states. 7 3 Some states have explicitly granted
the following groups of people and business entities access rights:
grandchildren,17 4 beneficiaries of the decedent's estate,175 those who
need access to a death certificate "for the determination or protection of
their personal or property rights,"176 and insurance companies, banks or
hospitals with which the decedent had entered into business
transactions.' 77
168 See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (describing purpose of laws limiting
access to death certificates).
169 See IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 39-270 (2011) (delineating death certificate access proce-
dures); ME. REV. STATr. tit. 22, § 2706 (2011) (same); see also Hannevig, AP 2010-0091, 2010
PA O.O.R.D. at 3 (Feb. 25, 2010) ("[T]he requested death certificate, a vital statistics record,
is not publicly available through the [state's freedom of information law].").
170 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-51(a) (2012).
71 HAW. REV. STAT. § 338-18(b) (2011).
172 See, e.g., OR. Riv. STAT. § 432.121 (2011); TENN. CoDE. ANN. § 68-3-205(d)(2)(D)
(2011).
173 Statutes may vary widely in the number of qualified parties to which they will explic-
itly provide access. For instance, New York's death certificate access law, known as one of
the strictest in the country, essentially permits access only to spouses, children, and parents of
the deceased, and those with certain legal claims or a court order. See N.Y. Pun3. HEALTH LAW
§ 4174.1(a)(2), (6)-(7) (McKinney 2012); see also William Heisel, A Public Death: State
Laws Hiding Death Certificates Can Hurt the Living, REPORTING ON HEALTH (Dec. 12, 2011),
http://www.reportingonhealth.org/blogs/2011/12/12/public-death-state-laws-hiding-death-cer-
tificates-can-hurt-living (commenting that New York "laws around death records are among
the most restrictive in the country"). Minnesota, on the other hand, liberally allows access to
anyone with a "tangible interest" in a requested death certificate, which by definition includes
several different types of family members, those with certain personal or property rights, estate
administrators, or any attorney who shows their bar license. See MINN. STAT.
§ 144.225(7)(a)(1), (3) (2011).
174 See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CoDE' § 8:2A-2.I(a)(3) (2012).
175 See TENN. Conn. ANN. § 68-3-205(d)(2)(D)(iii).
176 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 3110(b) (2011).
17 See ARIz. ADMIN. ComE § R9-19-405(3) (2011).
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Interestingly, a handful of states following the closed-access ap-
proach enacted statutory sunset provisions that dissolve any death certifi-
cate public-access restrictions, allowing public access to inspect and
copy an individual's death certificate once a specified number of years
elapse after that individual's death.178 The specific number of years
needed to release the certificates differs among states, as the mandated
time periods across these sunset provisions vary from 25179 to 40180 to
50181 to 75182 to 100 years.' 83 With such variation among sunset provi-
sions, each state legislature's selection of the exact number of years for a
sunset provision seems arbitrary. While the sunset provisions' statutory
texts 8 4 and legislative histories'85 largely do not reveal the policy con-
siderations underlying these provisions, this type of provision is likely a
legislative compromise between the privacy concerns of decedents' fami-
lies and the public's right to inspect public records. 186 Not all states
following the closed-access approach have chosen to enact sunset provi-
sions. Many flatly prohibit the public release of death certificates regard-
less of the age of the death certificate.' 87
2. Death Certificate Access: Judicial Treatment
Courts generally agree that expanding or restricting access to death
certificates is fundamentally a legislative function.' 88 They have held
that legislatures have the power to confer rights upon the public to access
death certificates, as well as the power to exempt the certificates from
178 See, e.g., ALA. Coon § 22-9A-21(f) (2011) (including sunset provision that releases
death certificates to the public once 25 years elapse after the decedent's death); TEx. Gov'r
CoEi ANN. § 552.115(a)(2) (West 2012) (same).
179 See, e.g., MN. Rny. STAT. tit. 22, § 2706.7 (2011) (providing that death certificates
become public records "25 years from the date of death").
180 See Diu.t. CoDE ANN. tit. 16, § 3110(f) (deeming death certificates to be accessible to
the public once "40 years have elapsed after the date of death").
181 See, e.g., S.C. CoDE ANN. § 44-63-84 (2011) (anyone may obtain a copy of a death
certificate once 50 years elapse after the date of death).
182 See HAW. REV. STrAr. § 338-18(e) (2011) (permitting anyone "working on genealogy
projects" access to death certificates if 75 years have passed since the date of death).
183 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-51a(a) (2012) (restricting access to death certificates less
than 100 years old).
184 See supra notes 178-83 (listing examples of statutory provisions).
185 See, e.g., SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM., FISCAL NoTE, S.B. 361, (Pa. 2011) (illus-
trating legislative history of statutory sunset provision enactment).
186 See infra Part Ill.A.3 (discussing the public interests involved in open access to death
certificates).
187 See, e.g., Miss. CoDE. ANN. § 41-57-2 (2011) (lacking sunset provision in statute gov-
erning access to death certificates); Mo. Rv. STAT. § 193.255 (2012) (same); N.Y. PUB.
HEALT'H LAW § 4174 (McKinney 2012) (same).
188 See, e.g., Soc'y of Profl Journalists v. Sexton, 324 S.E.2d 313, 314 (S.C. 1984) (re-
stricting the class of persons who may access death certificates is a legislative function).
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disclosure by statute and regulation.1 89 Accordingly, courts have gener-
ally upheld statutes that provide full, partial, or no public access to death
certificates as valid exercises of legislative authority' 90 that do not give
rise to any constitutional violation.191
When no particular statute governs the disclosure of death certifi-
cates, courts often find that the certificates are "public records main-
tained by a public body and are subject to [state] FOIA disclosure
requirements." 9 2 At the same time, courts generally also uphold statutes
and corresponding regulationsl 93 that place restrictions on the public's
access to death certificates, finding that these laws create exceptions to
the state freedom of information law's general duty to disclose.194 Some
courts recognize that the statutes prohibiting public access to death certif-
icates "acknowledge the privacy interests of the [deceased's] family
members." 95
3. Statutes Restricting Access to Death Certificates Harm the
Public Interest and Are in Need of Legislative Reform
The following sections analyze the public and privacy interests in-
herent in providing access to death certificates and demonstrate how ac-
cess-prohibitive statutes clash with several public interest considerations.
The sections also question whether the privacy concerns, which appar-
ently underlie the access-prohibitive statutes, are in fact misplaced and/or
unwarranted. Recommendations for substantive statutory revision, so
that the death certificate access statutes more effectively serve the public
interest, follow a critique of the competing interests underlying the cur-
rent set of death certificate access statutes.
189 See Shuttleworth v. City of Camden, 610 A.2d 903, 913 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1992) ("An exception to access under [state FOIA] may also be established by statute and
regulation . . . .").
190 See Yeste v. Miami Herald Publ'g. Co., 451 So. 2d 491, 492 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(upholding statute providing the public with partial access to death certificates); Justice v.
Fuddy, 253 P.3d 665, 670-71 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011) (upholding statute providing no public
access to death certificates); Swickard v. Wayne County Med. Exam'r, 475 N.W.2d 304, 326
n.48 (Mich. 1991) (acknowledging state statute provides full public access to death
certificates).
191 See Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Assoc., Inc., 379 So. 2d 633, 640-41
(Fla. 1980) (rejecting argument that a constitutional right of privacy prevents public disclosure
of documents of a personal nature).
192 Sexton, 324 S.E.2d at 314. See also 88 Op. N.H. Att'y Gen. 39, 1988 N.H. AG LEXIS
24, at *1 (Aug. 16, 1988) (reviewing state court decisions).
193 See 12 VA. ADMIN. Cooin 5-550-470 (2011) (example of a state regulation governing
access to death certificates).
194 See Fuddy, 253 P.3d at 670-71 (examining statute that exempts public health records
from state FOIA disclosure).
195 Ohio v. Watkins, No. 91-T-4555, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 6414, at *25 (Dec. 31,
1991).
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a) Open-Access to Death Certificates Benefits the Public
One may argue that the content contained within death certificates is
a private matter and that members of society might seek such informa-
tion for nothing more than "idle curiosity."l 96 This argument ignores the
numerous ways in which the public benefits from open access to death
certificates. For instance, statutes that provide full public access to death
certificates: (1) harmonize with the principles underlying the freedom of
information laws; (2) allow any interested party to inspect a set of death
certificates in order to uncover instances of government wrongdoing;
(3) permit relatives, friends, significant others, and anyone else close to
the deceased to access a decedent's death certificate for emotional clo-
sure; (4) enable the media and other concerned parties to uncover spe-
cific instances of medical malpractice and other types of harmful health
practices by analyzing information within death certificates; (5) allow
any interested individual or group to research public health and safety
trends based upon data collected from death certificates; and (6) permit
individuals and groups interested in family ancestry to conduct genealog-
ical research. The following sections explore these enumerated public
benefits.
i) Open-Access Statutes Align with the Policies
Motivating Freedom of Information Laws
First, open-access statutes align with the pro-transparency, open-
government principles that motivate state freedom of information
laws.19 7 The public has a general right to inspect public records held by
government agencies under these laws, and, under a straightforward
FOIA-type analysis, death certificates are unmistakably public records.
They are records maintained by local and state government agencies that
officially memorialize the legal fact of an individual's death.198
More specifically, providing access to death certificates can inform
citizens of "what their government is up to," which is the primary pur-
pose of FOIA as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 199 For instance, ac-
cess to death certificates can apprise the public of error rates and trends
in death certificates completed by local coroners, medical examiners,
196 See Clay Calvert, Revisiting the Voyeurism Value in the First Amendment, 27 SENAITLE
UNv. L. Rev. 721, 740 (2004) (discussing "idle curiosity" arguments in public access
disputes).
197 See supra Part LA (discussing open-government policies that motivate FOlA laws).
198 See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 89 F.3d 897, 905 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (defining a "public record" as "a government document created and kept for the
purpose of memorializing or recording an official action, decision, statement, or other matter
of legal significance, broadly conceived.").
199 U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773
(1989).
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physicians employed by public agencies, and others acting in a public
capacity.200 Errors in death certificates are a prevalent issue nationally,
with empirical studies demonstrating multiple errors in the majority of
death certificates reviewed. 2 0 1 Common glaring errors include incom-
plete certificates, illegible handwriting, inscrutable abbreviations, and no
specific cause of death entered. 2 0 2 Essentially any citizen without medi-
cal training could spot these common errors while reviewing a sample of
requested death certificates.
Death certificate errors have significant consequences by creating
inaccuracies in vital statistics reporting and in population-based research,
which relies on vital statistics and plays a significant role in the alloca-
tion of public health resources. 2 0 3 Opening death certificates to the pub-
lic may boost transparency and benefit society by enabling members of
the public to inspect death certificates for errors and hold accountable
any public officials who, in the performance of their duties, routinely
create errors in the death certificates they complete. Such beneficial op-
portunities are not present in states that have prohibited public access to
death certificates.
ii) Open-Access Statutes Help Provide Closure to
Anyone with a Close Relationship to the
Deceased
Society also benefits from open-access to death certificates by al-
lowing any relative or significant other to access the deceased's death
certificate. Federal and state government agencies recognize that view-
ing a death certificate provides important personal benefits by providing
200 See supra Part II.A (discussing the role of physicians, coroners, and medical examin-
ers in completing death certificates).
201 See Bobbi S. Pritt et al., Death Certification Errors at an Academic Institution, 129
ARCHIVES OF PATHOLOGY & LAB. MED. 1476-79 (2005) (identifying multiple errors within
82% of a death certificate sample and concluding that death certificate errors are common);
Stephen J. Cina et al., Accuracy of death certification in two tertiary care military hospitals,
164 MIL. MED. 897-899 (1999) (finding high prevalence of errors in sample of death certifi-
cates); Adil T. Degani et al., The Effect of Student Training on Accuracy of Completion of
Death Certificates, 14 MED. EDUC. ONLINE. 17 (2009), http://med-ed-online.net/index.php/
meo/article/download/4510/4690 (noting that "[a]ccurate completion of death certificates is
generally poor.").
202 See Pritt, supra note 201, at 1476 (describing common mistakes within death certifi-
cates); Vermont Dept. of Health, Examples of Common Mistakes on Death Certificates, http://
healthvermont.gov/hc/deathcertificate/mistakes.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (same).
203 Pritt, supra note 201, at 1476 (explaining how death certificates contain "epidemio-
logic data that are essential for formulating vital statistics and allocating public health
resources.").
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the deceased's loved ones in many instances with emotional closure,
peace of mind, and documentation of the cause of death. 204
Most closed-access statutes explicitly provide only certain catego-
ries of family members with access rights, and the statutes usually do not
include siblings, grandparents, grand-children, great-grand-children,
aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, cousins, step-parents or step-children in
their seemingly artificial access categories. 205 Accordingly, the closed-
access statutes treat these family members like any other member of the
public by prohibiting them in the ordinary course from viewing or re-
ceiving copies of their deceased relative's death certificate. Moreover, if
the decedent was in a relationship with an unmarried partner, the closed-
access statutes almost never grant to the unmarried partner explicit ac-
cess rights to the death certificate. 206 Ironically, the bonds that had been
developed by the deceased with these extended family members and sig-
nificant others may be equally strong or stronger than those with the
more traditional family members, such as spouses, parents and children,
who often have special access rights via the closed-access statutes.
The delineated relationship access categories in many closed-access
statutes and the unfair treatment they create raise significant policy con-
cerns. If the driving purpose behind closed-access statutes is to protect
the family's privacy interests, then it is unclear why many closed-access
states categorically exclude certain family members from death certifi-
cate access while including others. Equally unclear is the process by
which state legislators settled upon the relationship category barrier dis-
tinctions. Such issues are absent in open-access jurisdictions, where the
states have created no barriers to access, and where anyone may experi-
ence emotional closure through receiving a death certificate.
204 See Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, Completion of Death Certificates in the
Aftermath of a Hurricane, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/hurricane-certification.pdf (last
visited Apr. 9, 2012); State of Oklahoma, Importance of Death Registration, at http://www.ok.
gov/health/Data.andStatistics/Center For HealthStatistics/Training_&-Materials/Impor-
tanceof DeathRegistration.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
205 See supra Part III.A.1 (describing relationship categories in closed-access statutes).
See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 3110(b) (2003) (permitting spouse, children, parents or
guardians with death certificate access rights); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-205(d)(2)(D)(i)
(2011) (permitting spouse, children, parents, or other next-of-kin with death certificate access
rights).
206 Two exceptions are Maine and New Jersey, which have closed-access statutes that
permit death certificate to registered domestic partners, among others. See ME. REv. STAr.
ANN. tit. 22, § 2706.5 (2004); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 8:2A-2.1(a)(3)(iii) (2012). Many people in
closed-access jurisdictions have shared their stories in public forums of being denied access to
their deceased partner's death certificate. See, e.g., Tara Parker-Pope, How Hospitals Treat
Same-Sex Couples, N.Y. TIMEs WELL BLOG (Sept. 14, 2012, 8:06 PM), http://well.blogs.ny-
times.com/2009/05/12/how-hospitals-treat-same-sex-couples/ (noting experience of individual
being denied his deceased same-sex partner's death certificate).
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iii) Open-Access Statutes Bring Additional Benefits to
the Public
Open-access statutes benefit the public interest in additional ways.
Because these statutes permit anyone to inspect death certificates, jour-
nalists, media organizations, and motivated members of the public in
open-access jurisdictions have the ability to detect, investigate, and ex-
pose specific instances of medical malpractice and other types of harmful
and unethical health practices by examining individual death certificates.
Such examinations have led to "countless investigative stories in the pub-
lic interest." 207 One journalist pointed out that, due to California's open-
access statute, he obtained death certificates that led him to spot and
reveal to the public several news stories covering physician malpractice
and discipline, painkiller abuse, medical errors, and organ trafficking. 208
For these reasons, obtaining death certificates as investigative tools could
ultimately raise public awareness on harmful health practices and elicit
changes in health policy. Such opportunities are not present in states that
adopted closed-access statutes. 2 0 9
Open-access statutes also allow any person, organization, or institu-
tion interested in broad public health and safety trends to conduct re-
search and potentially advance scientific knowledge in these areas by
using information from death certificates as data sources. Death certifi-
cates offer a wealth of data for public health researchers to analyze, 210 as
the certificates contain medical information regarding the causes and
manner of death, as well as a host of demographic information. 2 1 1 Some
closed-access statutes permit researchers to use death certificates as data
sources too, but a subset has imposed overly restrictive conditions on the
207 Heisel, supra note 173; see also Hannah Bergman, Unearthing an Unusual Privacy
Battle, 33 THm NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, 19 (2009) (stating that for journalists, death certifi-
cates "have been crucial in piecing together stories; the Omaha World-Herald used them in its
investigation of coroner training.").
208 See Heisel, supra note 173; see also Chelsea Conaboy, Private lives, public deaths?,
BosTON (Sept. 14, 2012, 20:12 PM) http://www.boston.com/2011/12/12/clipboard/2HIN7lYf
4LOggEopD4YPBL/story.html (discussing how death certificate access may be valuable in
addressing the widespread problem of deaths due to medical errors committed by health care
professionals).
209 As an example of the difficulties encountered by investigators attempting to obtain
death certificates in closed-access jurisdictions, see Chris Dickerson, Writer Sues Cabell Offi-
cials over Access Records, WEST VIRGINIA REcoRn (Jan. II, 2012), http://wvrecord.com/
news/240879-writer-sues-cabell-officials-over-access-to-records (describing freelance journal-
ist's attempts to compel a death certificate release of a woman who died at the hands of a
physician with an extended history of malpractice).
210 E.M. O'Sullivan, Using Epidemiological Surveillance Systems and Routine Data Sets
to Study Place of Care and Place of Death, 25 PALLIATIVE MED. 94 (2011) ("[D]eath certifi-
cates have a long tradition in public health research either as primary data sources or in combi-
nation with administrative databases, chart reviews, interviews and questionnaires.").
211 See supra Part II.A (discussing the form and content of death certificates).
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type of research being conducted 212 and on the types of investigators
permitted to conduct the research. 213 These overly restrictive conditions
within certain closed-access statutes obstruct potentially beneficial re-
search. 214 Other closed-access statutes plainly do not include researchers
in their list of approved persons who have special access to death certifi-
cates.215 The closed-access statutes that prohibit research access or place
unnecessary restrictions upon investigators' abilities to conduct research
hinder a process that could otherwise produce useful scientific findings
for the benefit of society. 2 16
Finally, open-access statutes carry the social advantage of allowing
families, historians, and other interested parties to conduct genealogy2 17
research by freely examining death certificates for ancestry information.
Genealogical research, the tracing of ancestry, provides substantive bene-
fits to society; as one court explained:
"The 'benefits' to be derived from . . . genealogical ac-
tivity are highly intangible, but nevertheless real. Self-
knowledge can only lead to greater family stability, ben-
efiting both the individual and society, and a greater ap-
preciation of the common heritage shared by all
Americans." 218
212 Some state-imposed research restrictions are justifiable, though others seem superflu-
ous. See, e.g., LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 40:41(D)(2)(a) (2012) (putting forth a vague standard
that the research must be in "the best interest of the state or the public health of its citizens");
luL. ADm. CoE tit. 77, § 500.70(c) (2012) (listing conditions by which researchers must com-
ply, including that the "research will not duplicate other research already underway using the
same data"); WASH. ADMIN. CoDF § 246-490-030.4(b) (2011) (permitting state agency to deny
research requests if the agency deems the request to be without merit).
213 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:41(D)(2)(b) (putting forth vague standard that a
researcher must be "well qualified to conduct research"); lu.. ADM. ConI, tit. 77,
§ 500.70(c)(5) (setting forth similar restrictions).
214 For an example of an individual's request for death certificates in order to carry out
legitimate research efforts, see Charles v. Office of the Armed Forces Med. Exam'r, 730 F.
Supp. 2d 205, 208 (D.D.C. 2010) (describing thwarted efforts of retired veteran and vice-chair
of "Soldiers for Truth" non-profit organization to obtain death certificates of fallen soldiers
with bullet wounds in torso areas in order to conduct research investigating the effectiveness of
U.S. military's body armor issued to service members). If a person unaffiliated with a govern-
ment or university research enterprise, such as the plaintiff in Charles, attempted to obtain
death certificates from state vital records offices, virtually all vital records offices in closed-
access jurisdictions with limited research exemptions would reject the request due to the lack
of qualifications.
215 See, e.g., Miss. CoDr. ANN. § 41-57-2 (West 2007) (research purposes not included in
death certificate access statute's identification of parties with access permission).
216 For an example of a study that has produced useful scientific findings through death
certificate data analysis, see Abdirahman Mahamud et al., Herpes Zoster-Related Deaths in the
United States: Validity of Death Certificates and Mortality Rates, 1979-2007, 55 CLINICAL
INFECmIous DISEASES 960 (2012).
217 Genealogy can be defined as "the study of families generationally." See, e.g., Gris-
tede's Foods, Inc. v. Unkechuage Nation, 660 F. Supp. 2d 442, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
218 Callaway Family Ass'n v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 340, 342 (1978).
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Genealogy can be a hobby for some2 1 9 and a profession for
others, 2 2 0 though all engaging in genealogical research will likely turn to
death certificates and other vital records to carry out a significant amount
of their work. Indeed, government agencies have acknowledged that ge-
nealogists usually need to inspect death certificates in order to trace fam-
ily lineage adequately.221
Closed-access statutes generally prevent genealogy researchers from
accessing death certificates, unless a requester otherwise meets one of
the statutes' limited access categories, such as being the next-of-kin. 2 2 2
If the closed-access statute contains a sunset provision that releases death
certificates to the public after a certain number of years, the genealogy
researcher may need to wait for decades until the agency releases the
certificate for inspection.223  Such issues are avoided in open-access
jurisdictions.
b) Examining the Privacy Concerns Inherent in Releasing
Death Certificates to the Public
Legislatures and the judiciary agree that the disclosure of informa-
tion contained within death certificates implicates privacy interests, 2 24
and state government officials indicate that privacy concerns have pro-
pelled the enactment of closed-access statutes. 2 2 5 While these privacy
concerns are oft-referenced, substantive analysis of these concerns as
they pertain to death certificates is absent in statutory text, judicial opin-
ions and legal scholarship. 226 Determining whose privacy interests are
219 See, e.g., Starting Your Family Tree, N.Y. STATE LIBRARY, http://www.nysl.nysed.
gov/genealogy/famtree.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2012) (providing an introduction to geneal-
ogy research as a hobby).
220 Gristede's Foods, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (owner of genealogy consulting business and
former federal agency genealogy researcher providing testimony as genealogy expert witness).
221 See 87 Op. Ind. Att'y Gen. 6, 1987 Ind. AG LEXIS 17, at *1 (July 24, 1987) ("The
records generally required in family geneology [sic] research are birth, adoption and death
records."); Genealogy Requests, S.D. HFALTH DEP'T, http://doh.sd.gov/vitalrecords/genealogy.
aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2012) (death certificates and other records available for genealogi-
cal research).
222 See supra Part IIl.A.1 (describing closed-access statutes' relationship categories).
Some closed-access statutes contain provisions that grant limited access to death certificates
for genealogical purposes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 3110(b) (2011) (granting death
certificate access to those who demonstrate that the record is needed "for genealogical
purposes").
223 See supra Part III.A.1 (detailing the nature and function of sunset provisions within
certain closed-access statutes).
224 See supra notes 163, 168 and accompanying text, (describing privacy-related purpose
of laws limiting access to death certificates).
225 See 188 Op. Ariz. Att'y Gen. 130, 1988 Ariz. AG LEXIS 127, at *11-12 (Dec. 30,
1988); 1949 Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. 36, 1949 New Mexico AG LEXIS 30, at *3 (April 26,
1949).
226 The closed-access statutory text does not address the nature of the privacy interests
inherent in a death certificate's public release. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying
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implicated in a death certificate's release, and the exact nature of those
interests, requires exploration.
Common law precedents have firmly established that the deceased
have no privacy rights.227 Litigation parties in the past have attempted to
persuade courts that an agency's death certificate disclosure impinges
upon the deceased's privacy rights, but courts have uniformly dismissed
this argument. 228 The overwhelming weight of authority applying com-
mon law rights of privacy 229 holds that such rights do not survive one's
death,230 and that a decedent's family cannot enforce a privacy right on
the decedent's behalf.2 3 1
Courts in several jurisdictions recognize that, while the information
within death certificates generally refer to the decedents only, the dece-
dents' family members have their own set of privacy interests pertaining
to their feelings towards, and memories of, the deceased.232 Outside ac-
cess to death certificates creates tension with these interests due to the
sensitive medical information contained within the certificates, particu-
larly the "cause of death" section. The sensitive information, if dis-
closed, "might cause embarrassment and unwanted public attention to the
text. Judicial opinions occasionally reference privacy considerations in passing when address-
ing public disclosure of death certificates. See, e.g., Yeste v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 451
So. 2d 491, 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Schoeneweis v. Hamner, 221 P.3d 48, 52-53 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2009). Analysis of the topic as it pertains to death certificates has been largely
unaddressed in legal scholarship.
227 See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007,
2019 (2010) (discussing common law precedent holding that the deceased have no privacy
rights); Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropria-
tion, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 647, 664 (1991) (noting that any common law privacy right
dies with the person).
228 See Tri-State Publ'g Co. v. City of Port Jervis, 138 Misc. 2d 147, 150-51 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1988) (dismissing respondent's argument that the deceased possess privacy rights); Soc'y
of Prof'l Journalists v. Sexton, 324 S.E.2d 313, 315 (S.C. 1984) (same).
229 The doctrine of common-law privacy protects information that is: (1) highly intimate
or embarrassing, such that its disclosure would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person;
and (2) of no legitimate interest to the public. See Indus. Found. v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd.,
540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976).
230 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 (1965) ("Except for the appropri-
ation of one's name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a
living individual whose privacy is invaded."); Hendrickson v. California Newspapers, Inc., 48
Cal. App. 3d 59, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) ("[The] right of privacy is purely a personal one; it
cannot be asserted by anyone other than the person whose privacy has been invaded . . . .
Further, the right does not survive but dies with the person.").
231 See, e.g., Swickard v. Wayne Cnty. Med. Exam'r, 475 N.W.2d 304, 312 (Mich. 1991)
("A deceased person loses the right of privacy, and the right cannot be asserted by the next of
kin."); Fretz v. Anderson, 300 P.2d 642, 646 (Utah 1956) ("[Tlhe right of privacy is a personal
one which in the absence of statute, dies with the person to whom it is of value and cannot be
claimed by his estate or next-of-kin.").
232 See Yeste v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 451 So. 2d 491, 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Meriden Record Co. v. Browning, 294 A.2d 646, 649 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1971); Ohio ex rel.
Vindicator Printing Co. v. Watkins, No. 91-T-4555, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 6414, at *24-25
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1991).
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relatives of the deceased." 233 Case law cites examples of such sensitive
information, as when a death certificate notes that the deceased commit-
ted suicide or died from a drug overdose or a sexually transmitted dis-
ease.234 In the words of a former New Mexico Attorney General,
"[A]lcoholic or paretic death may be a fact, but no public official should
be required to make it a published fact." 235
Closed-access statutes keep death certificates and their attendant
sensitive medical information confidential, which "spare[s] the feelings
of the deceased's family." 236 Otherwise, the family risks uncomfortable
situations such as confrontation and embarrassment from outsiders' reci-
tation of the deceased's cause of death. Such confrontations could easily
intrude upon the family's grieving process. The family's interest in
grieving the deceased free from disrespectful public intrusion appears to
be the underlying crux of the family's privacy concerns in the death cer-
tificate disclosure framework. The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged
this interest in a separate context, noting that family members have a
stake in mourning their dead and opposing unwarranted public intrusion
that may degrade the family's respect for the deceased.237 Closed-access
statutes protect this interest against harm that could result from the death
certificate's release to individuals who have improper motives and lack
some direct or tangible interest in the death certificate.
In states with open-access statutes, it is unclear how frequently
spouses and other family members of the deceased face harassment, stig-
matization, and other types of intrusion from outsiders after they learn
sensitive medical information from the deceased's death certificate.
Case law references to this phenomenon-unwanted public intrusion re-
sulting from open death certificate access-are highly uncommon and
are generally discussed in only hypothetical terms.238 Furthermore, there
appears to be neither organized public movement within states with
open-access statutes to restrict access to death certificates, nor any news
233 Galvin v. Freedom of Info. Comm., 518 A.2d 64, 71 (Conn. 1986).
234 See Yeste, 451 So. 2d at 494; Meriden Record Co., 294 A.2d at 648 (referencing
commissioner of health's claim that "syphilis, miscarriages, cancer, tuberculosis, alcoholism
. . . [are] matters which at least some people would feel constitute an invasion of privacy").
235 1949 Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. 36, 1949 N.M. AG LEXIS 30, at *3-4 (April 26, 1949).
236 Yeste, 451 So. 2d at 494.
237 See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004) ("Family
members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to unwar-
ranted public exploitation that . .. tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to
the deceased person who was once their own.").
238 See, e.g., Yeste, 451 So. 2d at 494 ("If made public, this information could cause
public embarrassment to the deceased's family, as, for example, where the deceased has died
from an illegal drug overdose, by suicide, or from a socially distasteful disease such as vene-
real disease.").
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articles or other published commentary that substantively criticizes these
states for their open-access policies. 239
Some suggest that the privacy concerns touted as the principal justi-
fication behind the closed-access statutes' enactment are disingenuous, in
that the real resistance behind releasing death certificates to the public is
the administrative burden it creates for state agencies. 240 When a state
agency faces multiple requests for death certificates, responding to the
requests consumes employee time and drains resources. State govern-
ments' motivation to suppress access to death certificates in order to mit-
igate administrative burdens seems plausible, given that multiple sources
have indicated that death certificates are among the most commonly
sought-after records in freedom of information requests. 241 In a 1991
Attorney General Opinion, the Kentucky Attorney General confirmed
these suspicions to some degree:
In the past, thousands of researchers have visited the Of-
fice of Vital Statistics in order to inspect various birth
and death records stored there. Due to the overwhelm-
ing number of requests, meeting the various requests to
inspect the birth and death records has sometimes
presented a burden to the employees of the Office of Vi-
tal Statistics. Apparently in response to some of the
problems incurred at the Office of Vital Statistics, the
1990 Kentucky General Assembly enacted [a closed-ac-
cess statute] . . . which . .. limited public access to vital
records. The sponsors of the new law apparently in-
tended to . . . limit what the Cabinet for Human Re-
sources perceived as an overwhelming burden in
complying with various researchers' requests to inspect
birth and death records. 242
239 Such conclusions were drawn after the author conducted a set of online searches on
the topic. To the extent that family privacy concerns surround death certificate open-access
statutes, those concerns do not appear to be publicly discussed in a widespread manner.
240 See Yeste, 451 So. 2d at 494 (addressing defendant's argument that administrative
cost-efficiency purpose lies behind partial-disclosure statute passage); In re Rosier v. Snohom-
ish Cnty, 717 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Wash. 1986) (relaying investigation team's account where
"[o]fficials denied us access to the [death] certificates, first on privacy grounds, later contend-
ing that the staff lacked the time which would be required to get us the information we
sought.").
241 Kyle Niederpruem, Audit by Newspapers Finds Indiana Officials Routinely Violate the
Law, EvANsvI.LE COURIER (Feb. 22, 1998), http://www.nfoic.org/audit-by-newspapers
("Among the most sought records are death certificates."); Family History Driving Much of
Citizens' Public Records Searching, OREGON LivE (March 25, 2008), http://www.rcfp.org/
node/96454 (finding that death certificates are among the "most frequently sought by the aver-
age citizen").
242 91 Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 25, 1991 Ky. AG LEXIS 25, at *3-4 (Feb. 8, 1991).
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If certain states have restricted public access to death certificates due to
the administrative burden that access creates, citizens of those states ulti-
mately suffer. At minimum, such a possibility should increase skepti-
cism when state officials cite family privacy concerns as the principal
justification for maintaining closed access statutes.
4. Balancing the Public and Private Interests Inherent in Death
Certificate Access: A Case for Legislative Reform
An examination of the benefits and shortcomings of partial- and
closed-access statutes, currently adopted by a majority of states, reveals
that the unnecessarily restrictive statutes should be substantively
amended. The statutes contravene freedom of information laws and their
effects hamper broad areas of social activity that would otherwise benefit
the public. 2 4 3 Accordingly, as statutory amendment is a legislative func-
tion, state legislatures should revise these statutes so that they more ef-
fectively serve the public interest. Specific recommendations for
statutory revision follow a critique of the statutes that makes clear the
statutes' limited benefits and multiple shortcomings.
As a foundational matter, death certificates meet the requirements
for state freedom of information disclosure, putting aside any statutory
exemption applications, because they qualify as "agency records." 244
They are records maintained by local and state government agencies that
officially memorialize the legal fact of individuals' deaths. 2 45 Thus, the
central issue surrounding death certificate access is whether the immedi-
ate family's privacy considerations should exempt the certificates from
disclosure and thereby trump the public policy that public records are
open for reasonable inspection.
Structurally, the partial- and closed-access statutes address this cen-
tral issue through blanket per se non-disclosure, which offends the trans-
parency principles behind the freedom of information laws. Closed-
access statutes withhold the entire death certificate from the public, and
partial-access statutes withhold the cause of death portion, for all certifi-
cates, purportedly in order to protect the privacy concerns of those fami-
lies who might face public embarrassment stemming from sensitive
medical information contained within the deceased's death certificates.
243 See supra Part ill.A.3 (analyzing how partial- and closed-access statutes harm the
public interest).
244 See supra Part L.B (explaining that state freedom of information laws apply to state
agency records).
245 See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 89 F.3d 897, 905 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (defining a "public record" as "a government document created and kept for the
purpose of memorializing or recording an official action, decision, statement, or other matter
of legal significance, broadly conceived."); see also supra note 157 (providing examples of
states that treat death certificates as public records).
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Hence, the statutes embody a regulatory policy of general non-disclosure
in order to protect isolated instances where sensitive medical information
is present. For this reason, the general non-disclosure policy is inconsis-
tent with the balancing approach adopted in FOIA jurisprudence, which
evaluates the public and privacy interests on a case-by-case basis before
deciding whether to disclose. 246 The partial- and closed-access statutes'
blanket non-disclosure approach is a weak exercise of the state legisla-
tures' rulemaking authority.
The special, category-based access to death certificates that partial-
and closed-access statutes provide to the immediate family-those who
"have a direct and tangible interest" 247 in the certificates-and others
who meet specific relationship categories similarly offends freedom of
information laws and broader public policy principles. For example, fed-
eral and state freedom of information laws generally permit any person
to request government agency records, for any public or private purpose,
without the need to explain or justify the reason for the request, because
the requester's identity generally has no bearing on the merits of the re-
quest.248 By forcing requesters to identify their relationship with the de-
ceased, the partial- and closed-access statutes' relationship categories
clash with this nondiscriminatory aspect of the freedom of information
laws.
In effect, limiting death certificate access to a select few, based
upon artificially narrow categories, turns away certain family members,
friends, public health investigators, researchers, and others with legiti-
mate interests in the certificates, which in turn rails against the public
interest on multiple levels. For instance, restricting the public's access to
death certificate access may: (1) allow certain types of improper govern-
ment conduct to go unnoticed; (2) hinder investigations of harmful and
unethical health practices; (3) encumber certain types of beneficial re-
search activities; (4) prevent many from fully tracing family ancestries;
and (5) block many people close to the deceased from retrieving infor-
mation that will assist their grieving process. 2 4 9
Moreover, the statutes unfairly assume that the deceased's immedi-
ate family, along with any others who meet the statutes' relationship cat-
egories, are the only parties who are legitimately affected enough by the
decedent's passing to warrant death certificate access for closure, peace
of mind, and other coping-based purposes. The following example from
the New York Times' Ethicist column highlights the fallacy behind the
246 See supra Part I.A.2 (describing balancing tests under FOIA jurisprudence).
247 Supra note 171 and accompanying text.
248 See supra Part I.A. I (explaining role of requester identity in FOIA requests).
249 See supra Part III.A.3 (describing ways in which open-access statutes benefit the
public).
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statutes' assumption. The Times' columnist gave this advice to a reader
who inquired whether it would be "wrong" for him to check his friend's
death certificate, given that his late friend's widow gave evasive answers
to his question as to whether his friend had been suddenly ill, leaving the
reader feeling unsettled as to his friend's death:
It might vex the widow to discover that you ac-
quired this information, but that need not deter you.
Your long friendship with her late husband has its own
claims. It is a natural and honorable thing to want to
know how a close friend died. And it is estimable in
itself to gain a deeper understanding of the world, in-
cluding knowledge that is steeped in sadness. Even if
your friend himself had wished to conceal these bleak
details, you could seek them now: He is beyond being
harmed by your doing so. The dead have no claims to
privacy, something reflected not only in ethics but also
in law . . . .250
States should permit anyone affected by an individual's death to inspect
the death certificate to help with the grieving process, but this possibility
is absent in states that have adopted partial- and closed-access statutes.
This Article acknowledges the release of particularly sensitive med-
ical information that death certificates may contain as a legitimate area of
concern. In situations where such information is present, the immediate
family's privacy interest to avoid unwanted public attention, potential
embarrassment and harassment carries weight. However, the problem-
atic manner in which the partial- and closed-access statutes protect this
interest has created a significant burden at the public's expense, for the
reasons discussed above. These statutes could be revised in the follow-
ing manner to mitigate their detrimental effects.
Perhaps the simplest and most effective reform for state legislatures
to adopt would be to convert partial- and closed-access statutes into
open-access statutes by enabling the release of any death certificate in its
entirety to anyone who submits a freedom of information request. Enact-
ing this change eliminates the access barriers extended family members,
friends, public health investigators, and researchers, among others, cur-
rently face. The revised statutes would also harmonize with the strong
government transparency principles inherent in federal and state freedom
of information laws.
While this approach would allow anyone to access potentially sensi-
tive medical information contained within a death certificate, merely ac-
250 Randy Cohen, Cause of Death?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2006), http://www.nytimes.
com/2006/11/12/magazine/1 2wwln_ethicist.html.
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cessing the information does not necessarily create the feared privacy
intrusion; the third party's disrespectful accosting of a family member
does. If third parties inspect a death certificate and in turn intrude upon
the privacy of the deceased's family members, those family members
may have potential recourse through invasion of privacy causes of action
against the tortfeasors. 251 The remedies in tort may serve as a deterrent
against this type of public intrusion.
If a state legislature is uncomfortable with adopting open-access
statutes due to family privacy concerns, the legislature could adopt mea-
sures that mitigate the privacy concerns and slightly modify the shift to
death certificate open public access. These mitigation measures could
operate as follows. In circumstances where a death certificate contains
sensitive medical information, the deceased's next-of-kin or personal
representative could elect to have that sensitive portion of the death cer-
tificate redacted, while the remaining, non-redacted portions of the certif-
icate would be released for public inspection and copying. 252 If the death
certificate requester wished to obtain access to the redacted information,
she could request judicial review, where the applicable court would as-
sess the public and private interests at hand by conducting a balancing
test similar in procedure to that of FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). 2 5 3
These features would ensure the withholding of any unsettling conditions
the family members would rather not have become part of the public's
image of their loved one.
B. Public Access to Autopsy Reports
Mirroring the discord surrounding access to death certificates, juris-
dictions are similarly divided on whether or not to grant public access to
autopsy reports. The autopsy report, a written record of the autopsy pro-
ceedings, fits the state freedom of information definitions of public
records, as C/MEs are required by statute to prepare and file these docu-
ments.254 Some states accordingly permit access to autopsy reports with
251 Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an intrusion is tortious when it involves
intentional interference with the "solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or con-
cerns" and "would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B; see also Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994-995 (2d Cir. 1973) (affirming
invasion of privacy finding when defendant's conduct constituted harassment under New York
law).
252 To qualify as sufficiently sensitive to warrant redaction, the information would need to
"be of a kind that would shock the sensibilities of surviving kin," and based upon community
standards. Badhwar v. U.S. Dept. of Air Force, 829 F.2d 182, 185-86 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
253 See supra Part 1.A.2 (describing FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C) balancing tests).
254 See supra Pan II.A (detailing substance of autopsy reports and discussing procedures
that address their creation and filing).
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minimal restrictions, 2 5 5 while other states block public access to the re-
ports, largely due to the privacy concerns of the deceased's immediate
family. 2 5 6 The resulting governing law in this area is a peculiar assort-
ment of statutory pronouncements and common law precedent.
After an autopsy report is initially filed, virtually all jurisdictions
prohibit its public release if the report is implicated in ongoing law en-
forcement crime investigation efforts.25 7 Under this prohibition, known
in some jurisdictions as the "police secrets rule," 2 5 8 the autopsy reports
cannot be released if such release "would substantially impede, obstruct,
or interfere with an ongoing [criminal] investigation." 2 5 9 Otherwise, a
report's release could enable violators to evade detection, which "would
defeat the very purpose of the report" in these circumstances. 2 6 0 Once
the investigation has concluded and the case is closed, the reports are
eligible for release, 2 6 1 and it is at this point where states mainly diverge
in their approach to disclosure.
The controversy encompassing public access to autopsy records pits
the relational right of privacy against the public's right to access official
government records, but, as compared to the realm of death certificates,
the privacy concerns regarding autopsy reports are heightened due to the
significant volume of highly sensitive medical information routinely con-
tained within the reports. 262 The following sections analyze these issues,
in conjunction with an examination of the legislative and judicial treat-
ments of autopsy disclosure, and conclude with recommendations for re-
forming this area of jurisprudence.
255 See, e.g., AI.A. Cone § 36-18-2 (2011) (providing that autopsy reports "shall be public
records and shall be open to public inspection at all reasonable times."); Burroughs v. Thomas,
937 P.2d 12, 15 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that autopsy reports are public records and
thereby open to public for inspection).
256 See, e.g., IOWA CoDE § 22.7(41) (2011) (blocking public access to autopsy reports);
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Exam'r, 533 N.E.2d 1356, 1358 (Mass. 1989) (same).
257 Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. Aagerup, 429 N.W.2d 772, 776 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that autopsy report implicated in particular crime detection efforts exempted from public dis-
closure); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1.A(4) (2012) (exempting from disclosure autopsy
reports that pertain to ongoing criminal investigations).
258 78 Op. Fla. Att'y Gen. 23, 1978 Fla. AG LEXIS 142, at *9-10 (Feb. 21, 1978) ("The
only exemption which could arguably serve to exempt autopsy reports [from public disclosure]
... is the principle commonly known as the 'police secrets rule.'").
259 In re Buchanan, 823 A.2d 147, 153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). Under these circumstances,
the Government typically must show that the autopsy report's release "would have a substan-
tial negative impact on its investigation-for example, by keeping witnesses from coming
forth or preventing investigators from verifying information that they receive from infor-
mants." Id.
260 78 Op. Fla. Att'y Gen. 23, at *9.
261 See Shuttleworth v. City of Camden, 610 A.2d 903, 914 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1992) ("In the absence of any ongoing . . . investigation, and indeed precisely because the
investigation was closed without the filing of charges, we agree . . . that the public interest
would be served by release of the autopsy report.").
262 See supra Part [l.A (discussing autopsy report content).
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1. Autopsy Report Access: Legislative Treatment
Historically, autopsy reports were generally open to public inspec-
tion under the common law.2 6 3 As a customary practice, coroners and
medical examiners would typically treat autopsy reports as public
records and make the documents available to the public upon request. 2 64
Beginning in the 1960s, a number of states enacted legislation to exempt
autopsy reports from disclosure under state freedom of information
laws. 26 5 Privacy concerns are a motivating force behind the enactment
of these statutes, 266 with some State Attorneys General issuing opinions
that call for the withholding of autopsy reports from the public for pri-
vacy reasons. 267 The movement to withhold the public release of au-
topsy reports continues to the present, with roughly one-quarter of all
states expressly prohibiting public access via statute.268 The statutes
largely permit instances of conditional disclosure by allowing the rele-
vant agency to furnish requested autopsy reports to the decedent's next-
of-kin, personal representatives, and attending physicians, 269 prosecuting
attorneys, 270 public health officials, 271 and researchers, 272 among others.
Other states have chosen to continue to provide public access to
autopsy reports in accordance with their freedom of information laws,
once any criminal investigation has concluded. 273 A number of these
263 83 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. Unnumbered, 1983 S.C. AG LEXIS 62, at *3 (1983) (autopsy
reports were open for public inspection under the common law).
264 See, e.g., Swickard v. Wayne County Med. Exam'r, 475 N.W.2d 304, 314 n.15 (Mich.
1991) (discussing longstanding practice to release autopsy reports).
265 See N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 677.3(b) (McKinney 1965) (exempting autopsy reports from
public disclosure).
266 See, e.g., Galvin v. Freedom of Info. Comm., 518 A.2d 64, 71 (Conn. 1986) ("[T]he
legislature might reasonably have considered the information contained in autopsy reports to
be sufficiently sensitive to warrant the imposition of disclosure restrictions . . . .").
267 81 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. Unnumbered, 1981 S.C. AG LEXIS 74, at *1 (Oct. 27, 1981)
("In my opinion, this autopsy should not be disclosed to the public [because] it will invade the
privacy of [the next-of-kin] and also because it would be detrimental to the public interest that
this material be publicly displayed."); 82 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 12, 1982 Nev. AG LEXIS 22, at
*8 (June 15, 1982) (concluding that based upon a strong public policy to keep the "secrets of a
person's body" private and confidential, autopsy reports should not be open to public
inspection).
268 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.65.020(b) (2012) (exempting autopsy reports from state
FOIA public disclosure); IOWA CoDE § 22.7(41) (2011) (same); LA. REV. SrAr. ANN.
§ 44:19(A)(1) (2012) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 38, § 2 (2011) (same); N.D. CNrT. CoDE
§ 23-01-05.5.2 (2011) (same); OR. REv. STAT. 192.501(36) (2009) (same); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 611-B:21.III (2012) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-4-17(4) (LexisNexis 2012) (same);
VA. CoDE ANN. § 32.1-283.4(A) (2012) (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.105 (2012)
(same); W. VA. CODE § 61-12-10 (2011) (same).
269 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-4-17(3) (LexisNexis 1997).
270 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 61-12-10 (2010).
271 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.105 (2007).
272 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 611-B:21.I (2001).
273 See, e.g., TENN. CoDE ANN. § 38-7-1 10(c), (d)(2)(2012) ("[A]utopsy reports shall be
public documents . . . .").
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states explicitly permit access by statute, 2 7 4 and generally emphasize the
notion that autopsy reports are public records that must be made availa-
ble for public inspection; 275 several state attorneys general issued opin-
ions reinforcing this reasoning. 2 7 6
2. Autopsy Report Access: Judicial Treatment
A number of states lack statutory laws that address the accessibility
of autopsy reports nor has Congress enacted a specific statute that explic-
itly speaks to the accessibility of autopsy reports held by federal agen-
cies. 2 7 7  For these jurisdictions, the judiciary plays a critical role in
determining whether members of the public may access autopsy reports.
Few courts touched upon the public inspection of autopsy reports
prior to the 1980s. 2 7 8 Since that time, in jurisdictions where the legisla-
ture has not expressly addressed the public's right to inspect autopsy re-
ports, courts essentially have taken three different approaches to address
the issue: disclosure, privacy, and balancing approaches.
In the disclosure approach, courts hold that autopsy reports are gen-
erally open to the public for inspection under the relevant jurisdiction's
freedom of information law. 2 7 9 Some of the decisions brush aside argu-
ments pertaining to the privacy concerns of the decedent's immediate
274 See, e.g., Mo. Cooni ANN. STAEi, Gov'r § 10-617(b)(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2012) (autopsy
reports are open to the public); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-389(a) (2012) (same); WYo. STA'T.
ANN. § 7-4-105(a) (2012) (autopsy report in the form of a "written docket" is open to the
public).
275 See ALA. CoDE § 36-18-2 (LexisNexis 2011) (autopsy reports "shall be public records
and shall be open to public inspection at all reasonable times.").
276 See, e.g., 2007 Op. Ala. Att'y Gen. 15, 2006 Ala. AG LEXIS 142, at *2 (Dec. 4, 2006)
(opining that autopsy reports are public records generally open to public inspection); 97 Op.
Ark. Att'y Gen. 294 (Sept. 25, 1997) ("Autopsy reports that have been released by the State
Crime Laboratory . . . are subject to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act."); 63
Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 659, 1978 Md. AG LEXIS 49, at *17 (June 1, 1978) (opining that autopsy
reports are available to members of the public as directed by statute); see also 2011 Ltr. Rul.
Tex. Att'y Gen. 10369 (July 20, 2011) ("tAutopsy reports] are subject to required public dis-
closure in accordance with the [state FOIA].").
277 Federal agencies may conduct autopsies and generate autopsy reports. See, e.g., 1 8
U.S.C. § 4045 (2006) (granting certain federal officers with the authority to order autopsies to
be performed).
278 See 82 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 12, 1982 Nev. Att'y Gen. 47, LEXIS 22, at *3 (June 15,
1982) ("Extensive research has uncovered but one decision by a sister state upon this precise
question of public inspection of an autopsy report . . ."); People v. Williams, 345 P.2d 47, 63
(Cal. Ct. App. 1959) ("An autopsy report is a record that the coroner is required to keep . . .
and is therefore, a public record.").
279 See Denver Publ'g Co. v. Dreyfus, 520 P.2d 104, 106-07 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974);
Shuttleworth v. City of Camden, 610 A.2d 903, 914 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (uphold-
ing trial court's conclusion that public interest would be served by release of the autopsy
report).
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family members, giving paramount importance to the transparency of the
autopsy report to the public. 2 80
In the privacy approach, courts maintain that autopsy reports are not
open to the public due to the privacy concerns raised by the reports'
content. 281 The decisions effectively create common law access restric-
tions to match other jurisdictions' access-blocking legislation. 282 Courts
taking the balancing approach resolve the autopsy report access question
on a case-by-case basis. 2 8 3 If the family member privacy interests out-
weigh the public's interest in disclosure, courts typically prevent the rele-
vant autopsy report's inspection. The federal courts284 and a handful of
state courtS285 have generally followed this approach.
3. Assessing the Public and Privacy Interests in Autopsy Report
Access
Although some courts have criticized the release of medical infor-
mation within autopsy reports as "fulfill[ing] no purpose other than to
satisfy a prurient interest,"286 such criticisms ignore that disclosing au-
topsy reports may serve the public interest. Disclosure may help the
public to monitor the government's administration of justice in instances
where there have been suspicious deaths.287 A set of autopsy reports
may serve as an indicator of a medical examiner's job performance by
280 See Swickard v. Wayne County Med. Exam'r, 475 N.W.2d 304, 304 (Mich. 1991);
Findlay Publ'g Co. v. Schroeder, 669 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ohio 1996).
281 See Lawson v. Meconi, 897 A.2d 740, 747 (Del. 2006) (recognizing privacy protec-
tions provided for decedent's family members and prohibiting release of autopsy report);
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Exam'r, 533 N.E.2d 1356, 1358 (Mass. 1989) (prohibit-
ing release of autopsy report due to "strong public policy ... that favors confidentiality as to
medical data about a person's body").
282 See supra note 268 and accompanying text (listing statutes that block access to au-
topsy reports).
283 See infra notes 284-85 and accompanying text (detailing federal and state court
approaches).
284 The federal courts have applied Exemption 6 and 7(C) balancing test analyses when
evaluating whether autopsy reports held by federal agencies may be disclosed under FOIA.
See Badhwar v. U.S. Dept. of Air Force, 829 F.2d 182, 185-86 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that
the FOIA Exemption 6 balancing test may apply to the release of autopsy reports); Bowen v.
FDA, 925 F.2d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying FOIA Exemption 6 to the release of
autopsy report); Coleman v. FBI, 13 F. Supp. 2d 75, 79 (D.D.C. 1998) (applying FOIA Ex-
emption 7 to the release of autopsy records); see also supra Part I.A.2 (detailing FOIA Exemp-
tion 6 and 7(C) analyses). In Badhwar, the court inquired whether disclosure would constitute
a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," and noted that "[s]ome autopsy reports,
presumably, would not be of a kind that would shock the sensibilities of surviving kin. Others
clearly would." 829 F.2d at 185-86.
285 See Carlson v. Pima County, 687 P.2d 1242, 1246 (Ariz. 1984); Home News v State,
Dep't. of Health, 677 A.2d 195, 198 (N.J. 1996); Journal/Sentinel Inc. v. Aagerup, 429
N.W.2d 772, 775 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
286 Johnson Tribune Publ'g Co. v. Ross, 871 A.2d 324, 329 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
287 See infra note 293 (discussing problematic autopsies in certain homicide-related
cases).
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signaling, particularly to those with a medical background, the incompe-
tence, negligence, or misconduct of those conducting autopsies. 2 8 8 This
is especially important given that the public has a great interest in ensur-
ing that a medical examiner carries out his or her duties in a responsible
manner. 289
The formal duty of a coroner or medical examiner is "to inform the
public of the cause and manner of suspicious deaths." 290 Autopsy re-
ports are essentially records of the opinions of C/MEs on these issues. 291
By disclosing to the public an autopsy report, the official examination of
the cause and manner of death, 2 9 2 the C/ME releases this information for
evaluation. A suspicious death raises the possibility of criminal activity
and potential threats to public safety and order; whether the government
properly administers justice in a given instance may depend on the qual-
ity of the autopsy conducted. In this sense, the autopsy report may func-
tion to hold autopsy performers accountable for their official actions. 293
More broadly, opening autopsy reports to the public for inspection
maintains harmony with the overarching goals of the freedom of infor-
mation laws. As argued by a Pennsylvania state senator in favor of pub-
lic transparency, coroners are public officials "paid with the public dime
[to] provide impartial information. We don't want to put a burden on
families of victims of some tragedy . . . [but] coroners['] . . . obligation is
to provide [autopsy] information to the public." 2 9 4
While the public interest in the open access to government docu-
ments and the administration of justice may be strong in the context of
autopsy reports, the privacy interests involved may arguably be stronger
when balancing the competing interests. Autopsy reports "yield detailed,
288 See Marjorie A. Shields, Civil Liability in Conjunction with Autopsy, 97 A.L.R.5th
419 (2010) (outlining civil liability for misconduct in performing an autopsy).
289 See Campus Commc'ns., Inc. v. Earnhardt, 821 So. 2d 388, 401 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002)
("[T]he public obviously has a great interest in making certain its government, the medical
examiner in the instant case, carries out its duties in a responsible fashion ....
290 Johnson Tribune Publ'g Co., 871 A.2d at 329.
291 See CDC CORONERS' HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 11 ("Causes of death on the death
certificate represent a medical opinion that might vary among individual medical-legal
officers.").
292 Id.
293 See Matthew Henry, Autopsy Mistakes Leave Family with Questions about Death,
AVALANCHE-JOURNAL (July 26, 1997), http://lubbockonline.com/news/072797/autopsy.htm
(discussing how "foul play may have been involved in . . . [decedent's] death and a sloppy
autopsy may have failed to detect it"); Ryan Gabrielson, Solano County Opens Review into
Autopsies by Doctor with Checkered Past, CALIFORNIA WATCH (Feb. 24, 2011), http:l/
californiawatch.org/dailyreport/solano-county-opens-review-autopsies-doctor-checkered-past-
8894 (authorities examining over two dozen autopsies "from homicide cases performed by a
doctor with a history of errors and misdiagnosed rulings on causes of death").
294 Evamarie Socha, Autopsy Bill Curbs Public Right to Information, THE DAILY ITEM
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://dailyitem.com/0100news/xl304574800/Autopsy-bill-curbs-public-
right-to-information.
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intimate information about the subject's body and medical condition." 295
While the reports contain information regarding the decedent's cause and
manner of death, they also reveal "much more than the cause and manner
of death . . . [t]he report may contain sensitive . .. information related to
the decedent's medical history, such as whether he or she was HIV-posi-
tive."2 9 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has captured the intrusive na-
ture of autopsies:
An autopsy is an interrogation of the body. It is not
pleasant for the "layman" to contemplate what actually
is done to accomplish an autopsy; politely put, it is com-
prehensively deconstructive of the body. Being necessa-
rily comprehensive, autopsies reveal volumes of
information, much of which is sensitive medical infor-
mation, irrelevant to the cause and manner of death. Pri-
vate medical information protected in life does not
automatically become less private because of the per-
son's death. 297
Courts have highlighted the inherent unfairness of exposing sensi-
tive details of a decedent's health condition to the public as the result of a
statute requiring a medical examiner to file an autopsy report. 298 "If the
autopsy revealed that the decedent had AIDS or some other venereal dis-
ease or that his body contained cocaine or some other illegal drug why
should a member of the public have a right to know this?" 2 9 9
Courts have also recognized that releasing such sensitive medical
information for public inspection may traumatize the decedent's surviv-
ing family members, particularly during their time of mourning. 3"' The
release may violate "[c]ultural norms and common law traditions [that]
recognize a family's need to honor and mourn their loved one without
interference from the public." 30 ' By prohibiting the release of autopsy
reports with sensitive medical content, the government arguably protects
295 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Chief Med. Exam'r, 533 N.E.2d 1356, 1357 (Mass. 1989).
296 Johnson Tribune Publ'g Co. v. Ross, 871 A.2d 324, 329 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005); see
also 81 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. Unnumbered, 1981 S.C. AG LEXIS 74, at *1 (Oct. 27, 1981)
("The details of an autopsy report are of such an intimate, personal nature concerning vivid
medical allusions to parts of the human body, their description and indications of prior
history.").
297 Penn Jersey Advance, Inc. v. Grim, 962 A.2d 632, 638 (Pa. 2009) (Eakin, J., concur-
ring and dissenting); see also 82 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 47 (June 15, 1982) ("The fact that a
person dies in . .. [a way] which may require an autopsy is no justification for enabling public
knowledge of that which was closely guarded throughout his lifetime.").
298 Everett v. Southern Transplant Serv., Inc., 700 So. 2d 909, 911 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
299 Id.
300 Prison Legal News v. Exec. Office for U.S. Att'ys, No. 08-01055, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 84589, at *8 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2009).
301 Id.
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the emotional sensibilities of a decedent's family members and their in-
terest in preserving their memory of the decedent in a dignified manner.
4. A Note on Death Scene and Autopsy Photographs
Photographs of the decedent at the scene of death, during an au-
topsy, or both, may accompany an autopsy report in the decedent's au-
topsy file maintained by coroner or medical examiner, and the photos
accordingly face release as public records under various freedom of in-
formation laws. The disclosure of such photographs and their subse-
quent publication by the media is a major source of controversy.302' A
substantive body of scholarship has explored this controversy and has
examined the legal issues inherent in the accessibility of death scene and
autopsy photographs. 303 To round out the overview of death record ac-
cess law, a brief summary of this area of jurisprudence follows.
Legislatures and courts have accorded greater privacy protection to
autopsy and death scene photographs than to any other type of death
record. 304 Numerous state statutes explicitly render these photographs
inaccessible to the public.30 5 Federal courts have applied the FOIA Ex-
emptions 6 and 7(C) balancing tests to consistently find that the families'
privacy interest in keeping their deceased relative's photographs out of
the public realm outweighs the public's "practically nonexistent"3 06 in-
302 See Samuel A. Terilli & Sigman L. Splichal, Public Access to Autopsy and Death-
Scene Photographs, 10 COMm. L. & Pot'Y 313, 315 (2005) (discussing the public controversy
surrounding access to autopsy and death scene photographs); Clay Calvert, Privacy of Death,
26 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. Riy. 133, 134 (2006) ("Autopsy photographs, death-scene images of
suicides, pictures of the dead . . . are frequently found at the center of privacy-of-death
controversies.").
303 See, e.g., Terilli & Splichal, supra note 302, at 315; Calvert, supra note 302, at 134;
Martin E. Halstuk, When Is an Invasion of Privacy Unwarranted under the FOlA?, 16 U. FLA.
J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 361, 374 (2005); Hoefges, supra note 6, at 7; Autumn M. Montague, Note,
Do Not Disturb: Defining the Meaning of Privacy under the Freedom of Information Act, 49
How. L.J. 643, 650 (2006); David Hamill, Note, Privacy of Death on the Internet, 25 J. C.R. &
EcoN. Diy. 833, 835 (2011).
304 See, e.g., Shuttleworth v. City of Camden, 610 A.2d 903, 915 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1992) ("While the autopsy [report] is a 'public record' under the [state's FOLA], autopsy
photographs are not.").
305 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 45-16-27(d) (2011); ME. Ri~v. STAT. ANN. tit. 22
§ 3022(8)(F) (2011); N.J. STAr. ANN. § 47:1 A- 1.1 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAr. § 130A-
389.1 (2011); 65 PA. CONs. S-rAr. § 67.708(b)(20) (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-5-535
(2011). In addition to death scene and autopsy photographs, the statutes typically restrict pub-
lic access to audio and video recordings of the autopsy. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 5-14-3-4(a)(1 1)
(2012).
306 Epps v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 801 F. Supp. 787, 793 (D.D.C. 1992).
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terest 307 in the photographs. 308 State courts have generally reached simi-
lar findings.309
The special danger inherent in a photograph's release is its un-
seemly, sensationalistic mass reproduction, particularly through the In-
ternet.310 Courts have acknowledged this danger and have found that
public dissemination of these graphic photographs would cause devastat-
ing trauma to the decedent's family, exacerbating their grief and suffer-
ing.31' "[One] cannot deny the powerful sense of invasion bound to be
aroused in close survivors by wanton publication of gruesome [photo-
graphic] details of death by violence." 312 Conversely, courts have typi-
cally found no legitimate public value in the details revealed in such
photos.313
5. An Analysis of Autopsy Record Disclosure Laws and
Recommendations for Legal Reform
In many jurisdictions, legislatures and courts have analyzed autopsy
reports in the abstract to conclude on privacy grounds that the records
should not be disclosed to members of the public. This Article argues
307 Courts have routinely found no social value in the release of post-mortem photographs
of decedents. See, e.g., Catsouras v. Dept. of California Highway Patrol, 181 Cal. App. 4th
856, 874 (2010) ("[Photograph's release constituted] pure morbidity and sensationalism with-
out legitimate public interest . . . .").
308 The United States Supreme Court has recognized surviving family members' right to
personal privacy regarding the death-scene photographs of their deceased relative and has pre-
vented the public release of such photographs under FOIA Exemption 7(C). See Nat'I
Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004); see also Hale v. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, 973 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1992); Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 194
F.3d 120, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
309 See, e.g., Campus Commc'ns., Inc. v. Earnhardt, 821 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
310 See Favish v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting
that "it is not the production of the records that would cause the harms ... but their exploita-
tion by the media including publication on the Internet" and that "[t]he intrusion of the media
would constitute invasion of an aspect of human personality essential to being human, the
survivor's memory of the beloved dead."); Catsouras, 181 Cal. App. 4th at 863 ("[decedent's
death scene] photographs were strewn about the Internet and spit back at the family members,
accompanied by hateful messages.").
311 See Catsouras, 181 Cal. App. 4th at 863; see also Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. Rev. 477, 536-37 (2006) (discussing how families of those decedents
portrayed in released autopsy photos may experience mental anguish over the photos' release).
312 Accuracy in Media, 194 F.3d at 123; see also Prison Legal News v. Exec. Office for
U.S. Att'ys, No. 08-01055, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84589, at *11 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2009)
("Given the graphic nature of the photographs, public dissemination of these images could
impede the family's ability to mourn [the deceased's] death in private and achieve emotional
closure."). The vast majority of cases involving the release of death images feature graphic
and gruesome content. See, e.g., Showler v. Harper's Magazine Found., 222 Fed. Appx. 755,
762 (10th Cir. 2007).
313 See Catsouras, 181 Cal. App. 4th at 907 (finding the absence of any legitimate public
interest in the death scene photos' release).
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that such blanket prohibitions clash with freedom of information princi-
ples and violate public policy. It is possible that an autopsy report may
contain graphic, upsetting, and embarrassing content that raises signifi-
cant privacy concerns, but not all such records contain such content. A
more prudent approach calls for an examination of the public and privacy
interests pertaining to each requested autopsy record in order to deter-
mine whether the record should be available to the public.
As discussed in Part III.B.1, a significant number of statutes place
blanket prohibitions on public access to autopsy reports; these statutes
are overly broad and should be revised. The statutes are broader than
necessary to achieve their purpose of protecting sensitive medical infor-
mation within autopsy reports. Protecting sensitive medical information
is a valid, humane purpose, as recognized in a multitude of judicial opin-
ions. 314 Under the blanket non-disclosure statutes, however, legislatures
have exempted more autopsy reports than necessary to meet the statutory
purpose, as there are undoubtedly autopsy reports that contain minimal to
no sensitive information but are nevertheless blocked from public re-
lease. Such outcomes thwart the government transparency principles in-
herent in freedom of information laws.
Moreover, in some cases, it may be in the public's best interest to
access certain autopsy reports, despite any sensitive medical Information
within the reports. Examples of such beneficial releases include disclo-
sure to address substantive concerns regarding a medical examiner's job
performance in conducting autopsies, or, more generally, the govern-
ment's proper administration of justice when a suspicious death has oc-
curred. 315 By preventing access in these circumstances, blanket non-
disclosure statutes do not serve the public interest.
Legislatures should replace these blanket non-disclosure statutes
with statutes that adopt a balancing test approach better aligned with the
freedom of information laws' principles of open government. For each
autopsy report request submitted by a member of the public, the balanc-
ing test could evaluate the public's interest in accessing a requested au-
topsy report against the privacy interests in keeping the report
confidential. 3 16 Such a balancing test could mirror, in procedure, the bal-
ancing tests of FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C).317 In particular, if a re-
314 See supra Part 1II.B.2 (discussing judicial opinions that address the merits of protect-
ing sensitive medical information in autopsy reports).
315 See supra note 293 (describing public reports of medical examiner incompetence and
suspicious deaths).
316 Courts may look to the newsworthiness of the autopsy record, in addition to determine
the strength of the public interest in an autopsy records release, to survey government activity.
See Calvert, supra note 196, at 724 (discussing how newsworthiness is a key consideration in
obtaining public access to government records that implicate privacy concerns).
317 See supra Part I.A.2 (detailing the balancing tests of FOlA Exemptions 6 and 7(C)).
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quester is dissatisfied with an agency's decision to withhold an autopsy
report, she should have the right to petition the appropriate court for judi-
cial review. After applying a balancing test weighing the competing in-
terests, the court should order the report's release unless it finds that
releasing the report would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of
privacy."3 18 A court could also order sensitive information redacted and
dispositive content preserved, if possible.
Legislatures should also revise statutes that block public access to
death scene and autopsy photos by shifting from a blanket non-disclosure
approach to a balancing test approach as well. Such legislative reform
would more effectively serve the public by allowing the release of these
records when the public interest in access outweighs any privacy interest.
While public access to these documents is seemingly minimal, members
of the public should have the opportunity to demonstrate how access in a
particular case serves the public interest, by, for instance, contributing to
the public's oversight of a government agency. As Professors Terilli and
Splichal recommend, legislatures should also consider inspection-only
access rights when addressing the accessibility of these photographs,
given the special concerns regarding image reproduction and massive
electronic distribution of what may be highly graphic visual material.3t 9
CONCLUSION
Jurisdictions throughout the country have acknowledged the privacy
concerns inherent in public access to death records maintained by the
government. While in many instances, sensitive medical information
within certain death records justifies public withholding, some jurisdic-
tions have gone too far in prohibiting access to death records in the name
of privacy.
The public interests in death certificate access are valid, and these
public records should be accessible to any member of the public who
submits a proper freedom of information request. Autopsy records im-
plicate stronger privacy concerns and warrant withholding in some in-
stances, depending on the presence of sensitive medical information
within the records. Agencies and courts should evaluate autopsy record
requests on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the public interests
in the requested record's release outweigh any privacy interests present.
These proposed reforms should better align death record access laws
with the pro-transparency, open government principles of our freedom of
information laws.
318 Badhwar v. U.S. Dept. of Air Force, 829 F.2d 182, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
319 See Terilli & Splichal, supra note 302, at 346 (discussing inspection-only approaches
to death photograph access).
